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CHAPTER I 
THE FRAMEWORK 
The ideal study is one in Which the framework is as 
familiar to the reader as it is to the investigator. In 
fact, its usefulness is measured largely by the degree of 
understanding established initially in defining the area 
of investigation, the terms used, the method of procedure, 
and the limitations. 
Such rapport demands some mutual knowledge of the 
history and present status of the participants and their 
relationship, as well as a preview of the organization of 
the body of the report. 
I. MILITARY PUBLIC RELATIONS 
For the purposes of this paper the term, military 
public relations, encompasses the public relations activ-
ties--frequently referred to as public information--of all 
the military services and the Department of Defense. 
Public relations has been defined as "the management 
function which evaluates public attitudes, identifies the 
policies and procedures of an individual or organization 
with the public interest and executes a program of action 
to earn public understanding and acceptance."1 
1Harlan and Scott, Contemporary Public Relations; 
Principles and Cases (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), 
p. 3. 
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In government, or military, public relations there is 
the additional element of the public's right to know where 
and how the tax dollar is spent. 
In almost every instance military public relations 
will be discussed here at the Department of Defense level. 
There are three reasons for this: 
1. This is the level at which members of Congress 
choose to gather information on military public 
relations. 
2. Only at this level can a comprehensive study be 
made which Will produce the desired composite 
picture of military public relations as conducted 
by all of the services. 
~. It is at this level that necessary facts and fig-
ures are made available concerning the activities 
of the combined defense establishment. 
Prior to the passage of the National Security Act of 
1947, creating the Department of Defense and establishing 
unification, each of the services acted independently in 
the conduct of its public relations activities. They were 
answerable, of course, to higher authority, but to no cen-
tral authority, and with no formal means of interservioe 
coordination. 
In October of 1947 Secretary of Defense James Forrestal 
addressed a memorandum to the three service secretaries, their 
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ohiefe of staff, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and 
the Chairman of the Research and Development Board, whioh 
outlined the first steps to be taken toward unification of 
2 
the military public relations effort. 
At that time Secretary Forrestal apparently believed 
that a minimum amount of regulation was desirable, or 
necessary. He left the administration of public ralations 
activities in the hands of the secretaries, made no new 
policy recommendations, and concentrated primarily on 
establishing coordination machinery. A board, comprised of 
the heads of public relations of each of the three military 
departments, was designated to serve in an advisory capacity 
to the. newly appointed Secretary. In addition, each service 
was asked to detail a liaison officer to his office. 
Also in the memo, responsibility was assigned for 
security classification, the exchange and release of infor-
mation, and review of previously classified material. Five 
categories of information were listed which required clear-
ance by the Secretary of Defense prior to release. It is 
of interest to note that no public relatione division was 
formed in the new bffice. In fact, the memo specifically 
stated that no such division would be established. 
2see APPENDIX A., Copy of Secretary of Defense Memo-
randum dated 10 October 1947. Subject: Public Relations 
of the National Military Establishment. 
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4 
Only seventeen months later this decision was reversed. 
And on March 17, 1949, the Office of Public Information in 
the Department of Defense was established by one of the last 
3 directives of the late Secretary. 
It was a natural outgrowth of unification and was 
created in response to pressure from the press, the public 
and Congress. The press, in particular, was anxious to have 
a central agency with which to deal. Members of Congress also 
desired some central office where inquiries coming in from 
their constituents could be answered. 
The problem that had developed during the brief trial 
period was seemingly unsolvable under the original organiza-
tion, i.e., after the Department of Defense was established 
people desiring information concerning one of the services 
expected to obtain it from "the home office.~ Not finding 
such an office they oftentimes were sent to five or six 
different offices before an adequate answer was obtained. 
There were other factors involved, Congress apparently 
wished to achieve some economy as well as more efficient 
operation. For example, just prior to the establishment of 
the new office, the three services, operating their separate 
public relations staffs, had a total of about 520 people; 
3some preliminary steps had been t aken, e.g., the 
establishment on July 19, 1948, of the Office of Public 
Information, the opening on August 11, 1948, of a press 
~oom for joint use by the three services, etc. 
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5 
this figure was reduced to ~30. Eventually 285 were assigned 
to the Office of Public Information and the remaining 45 were 
divided among the three services to provide liaison with 
their respective field commands and departmental activities. 
~Finally, there was a feeling at the time, justified or not, 
that the services were to some extent operating their own 
4 
public information offices at cross-purposes.• 
The new Department of Defense Office of Information was 
to act as the sole agency for the release and dissemination of 
military information at the seat of government and was assigned 
many specific missions theretofore accomplished separately by 
the services •. The directive called for the creation of 
central Press, Radio-TV, and Pictorial Branches--the latter 
involving still and motion piet~_res, newsreels, and docu-
mentaries. Other activities provided for in the directive 
included News Digest and Analysis_,_ and Security Review Branch, 
Books and Magazines, National Organizations, Women's Division, 
Civilian Liaison, and Correspondence. 
Desk space was provided in the offices of OPI for 
newspaper and broadcasting correspondents to facilitate the 
release of news to the press, and thus the public. All in 
all, it was felt that the new directive had eliminated the 
~nited States Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 
1953, Hearings before Subcommittee, 82d Congress, 2d 
Session, on H. R. 7391, February 4-June 21, 1952 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 1286. 
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6 
awkwardness caused by previously scattered locations, and at 
the same time eliminated duplication and overlapping. 
Since 1949, a great many changes have taken place in 
what was originally called the OPI. Titles have been 
changed, new jobs have been created and old ones eliminated, 
the number of personnel and houre of operation have fluctu-
ated, etc. However, the general structure and mission of 
the office has remained the same. 
The important changes have been made above the Office 
of Public Information on the Department of Defense formal 
organization chart . 
As a resul t of the President 's Reorganization Plan 
No. 6, approved by Congress in 1953 1 several new Assistant 
Secretary offices were established. Thus, by 1954, serving 
over the Di~ector of the Office of Public Information, there 
was an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative and 
Public Affairs), and a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public 
Affairs. 5 The Division since that time has been referred to 
as the Office of Public Affairs rather than the Office of 
Public Information, which is now a subdivision. 
Each of the services had continued to retain public 
5United States Congress, House, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 
1955, Hearings before Subcommittee, 83d Congress, 2d 
Session, February 1-April 1, 1954. (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1954), pp. 542-545. 
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information activities in Washington, responsible to the 
secretaries of the military departments. 
As outlined in 1954 by Secretary of Defense Charles 
E. Wilson, and still in effect in 1957, these organizations 
were expected to: 
1. Confine their attention to items of intere-s-t 
within their own service. 
2. Make use of the consolidated activities. 
3. Coordinate their activities with the central 
office of public informationo 
6 4. Assist the central office as required. 
7 
As of June 1957, the Office of Public Affairs had a 
staff of 55 civilian employees and 48 military personnel and 
was operating on a budget of $450,000 a year. The resolu-
tion of policy matters relating to public information acti-
vities in the Department at the national level was being 
accomplished by the Public Information Coordinating Council. 
This council, meeting at leaat once a week, was composed of 
the chiefs of information of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
Marines, and was headed by the Deputy for Public Affairs who 
acted as chairman. 
As of this same period the office divided its work 
into three general categories: Public Information, Special 
Activities, and Security Review. It continued to maintain 
6Ibid. 
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Radio-TV, Pictorial, and Magazine and Book Branches, and a 
Speaker's Branch which arranged for speakers and prepared 
speech material by request. In addition there was a press-
room manned 24 hours a day, with separate service desks 
7 
coordinated by the Director of Public Information. 
It is generally conceded that the Pentagon is the 
source of more vital news, day in and day out, than any 
other agency of the government . Whether the country is at 
peace or war, military act ivity affects the lives of 
millions of people in a decisive and intimat e way.; it 
affects their homes, their careers , their pocketbooks, and 
their future. In short, it is an immense center of legiti-
mate news. Yet, the pe ople reaponsible for releasing this 
news are constantly faced With a dilemma peculiar to mili-
tary public relations. It is perhaps best described in the 
report made by the Committee on Classified Information: 
At the risk of stating a pl atitude, this country 
is far di fferent from a dictatorship, and the impact 
of that difference is strong on the problem of informa-
tion security. Being a democracy, the government 
cannot cloak i ts operations in secrecy. Adequate 
information as to ita act ivities must be given to its 
citizens or the foundations of its democracy will be 
eaten away. We find that the Department of Defense 
8 
7statement of J. R. Loftis, Director, Office of Admin-
istrative Services in Connection with Estimates for the 
Appropriation ~Salaries and Expens es, Office of Public 
Affairs. Department of Defense ~ for the Fiscal Year 1958. 
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, 
Department of Defense Appropri ati ons for 1958, Hearings 
before Subcommittee, 85th Congress, lat Session , on H. R. 
7665, May 23~June 21, 1957 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1957), pp. 1556-1557. 
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fully subscri bes to these principles. On the other 
hand, our democracy can be destroyed in another way, 
namely, by giving a potential enemy such information 
as will enable him to conquer us by war. A balance 
must be struck between these tw~ conflicting 
necessities. · 
In the Department of Defense there are peculiar 
factors which make the striking of the proper balance 
difficult. The Department spends roughl y two-thirds 
of the nationa l budget. At one time or another it 
directs the lives of millions of young men and women. 
And it is charged with pl anning for the survival of 
the nation in case of war. These considerations 
center public interest on its activities and weight 
the balance in favor of maximum disclosure. On the 
other hand, the activities of the Department are of 
the greates t interest to a potential enemy. He can 
profit from disclosures of its activi ties to a far 
greater extent than discl osures of the activities 
of most of the other governmental departments. So 
the other side of the scales is heavily weighted. 
The result is that striking the proper balance is 
more important and more difficult than is the case 8 
with most of the other departments of the government. 
9 
An Executive Order, number 10501, a tt empts to govern 
the determina tion of just how the proper balance is to be 
attained. It prescribes this dual objective: (1) to give 
the public ful l informat ion up to the p oint beyond which 
national security will be damaged, a nd ( 2) t o protect 
information beyond that point . As the committee notes 
however, ~it is one thing to have a theoretically sound 
system and qui te another thing to make it operate well in 
an enormous· organi zat ion such as the Department of Defense. 009 
8Repor t of Committee on Classified Information , to 
Secretary of Defense, November 8, 1956 . Charl es A. Coolidge, 
Chairman. pp. 1~2. 
9 Ibi d., p. ~ 
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Not even the briefest review of military public 
relations would be complete without some mention of the 
dilemma above. Another problem, almost as unique, has 
been the system of allocation, and the varied amounts of 
money made available for the conduct of military public 
relations down through the years. This topic will be dis-
cussed at more length later in the chapter, however, it is 
relevant here to note that the military public relations 
budget has dropped from approximately ten and one quarter 
million dollars to three and one quarter million dollars 
10 
over the last six years. 
Although the figures are not meaningful in them-
selves--and it should be remembered that we were at war in 
1952 and not in 1957--the impact of an 87 percent budget 
decrease and the reasons behind it are significant to this 
study. 
II. THE CONGRESS 
The Constitution of the United States provides that 
certain government powers be delegated to the Federal gov-
ernment rather than to the State governments. One of these 
is the power to maintain armed forces. However, for the 
10House Hearings, 1955, £2• cito, p. 546 shows 1952 
expenditure was $10,245,345. Preaent limitat i on is 
.3,270,000, see Navy Budget Digest Fis cal Year 1957g 
(NAVEXOS P-1355), Department of the Navy, p. 11. 
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Executive Branch of the Federal government to exercise this 
power, funds must first be appropriated by the Legislative 
Branch--the holder of the ~purse-etrings.M 
It is because of this check, or power of restraint, 
given to the Legislative Branch by the men who wrote the 
Constitution that Congress must be included in any dis-
cussion of military public relations. 
Assuming the importance of Congress to the subject 
ll 
at hand is conceded, some review of its composition, privi-
leges, problems, and tools would seem in order. While this 
might appear to be a rather elementary procedure--and indeed 
it is recognized as such--nevertheless the reader's indulgence 
is sought. The purpose of what follows--to establish a mutual 
framework, or image, upon which to base subsequent information--
compels the investigator to start at the beginning in order 
to "set the scene.M 
Congress is made up of 5~1 United States citizens who 
have had their citizenship for at least seven years, are 25 
years old or more and receive an annual salary of $22,500. 
All of them are elected directly by the people, they are 
charged with making laws for the people, and, they continue 
to hold office only so long aa the people support them at 
the ballot box. 
The present Congress, the 85th, began on January ~, 
1957. It is Democratic, as of May 3, 1957, 283 of its 
members were Democrats and 246 were Republicans. (Two 
vacancies}. It has 16 lady legislators, nine Democrats and 
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12 
seven Republicans. Of these, 15 are serving in the House, 
the other, Mrs. Margaret Chase Smith (Republican, Maine) is 
11 
the only lady Senator. 
Members of Congress are granted a number of benefits 
and privileges, not the least of which is an immunity which 
prevents their arrest for other than serious crimes, and 
allows them to say what they wish on the floor of Congress 
or in committee without fear of civil suit or arrest. 
They are permitted to make six round trips between 
their homes and Washington, D. c., each year at government 
expense, are allowed $1,200 yearly for stationery, receive 
$3,000 of their salary tax free, and franking privileges. 
In addition, they receive an allowance for long distance 
telephone calls and telegrams, and are eligible for 1o--cost 
life insurance, free medical care, and pensions. To conduct 
his business, each Congressman is provided with a Washington 
office, an office in his home state, and from $26,000 to 
$64,500 per year for staff pay. 
Congre s smen in the pursuit of their duties are pre-
12 
sented with thousands of bills each year--16,780 in 1956. 
Because no single Senator or Representative could possibly 
read through and analyze so many proposals, the work of 
studying and reporting on the mer its of the separate billa is 
divided among many designated committees . 
11 Congres s at Work; Facts, Functions , Organizations 
and Personalities of the 85th Congress, A Handbook, 
prepared by ScholastiCMagazinee, New York, 1957, p. 5. 
12 Ibid., p. 7 . 
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13 
"On the hillM there are four main types of committees: 
the Standing Committee, which is permanent and deals with 
broad fields of government interest (15 in the House and 19 
in the Senate); the Subcommittee, which deals with only one 
aspect of a Standing Committee's work (usually more than 100); 
the Special Committee, created to perform only some specific 
task; the Joint Committee, made up of members from both the 
Senate and the House. 
In order to obtain the necessary facts upon which to 
base their legislative decisions, committees generally con-
duct hearings during which they examine Witnesses, accept 
statements, and pry into matters relevant to the subject or 
agency being studied. 
It is this functional keystone upon which is built the 
relationship of military public relations to Congress. More-
over, it is the hearing which provides the grist for the mill 
of congressional opinion, and this study. 
III. THE STUDY 
The age-old thorn in the three sides (Executive, 
Judicial, and Legislative) of this democratic government is 
the continuing conflict of opinion as to what constitutes a 
balanced information policy. 
When the pricking pain becomes acute--because of 
Press or public clamor--the government body begins to writhe. 
Miraculously, doctors, from every walk of life, suddenly 
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appear. Each is apparently equipped and trained to 
ease the pain. 
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Some prescribe an emetic, believing that the throb of 
conflict will disappear if there is a sudden outpouring of 
the poison assumed to have been built up as a result of 
holding back information. Others, equally learned, take 
the opposite or paragoric view. Quite a few examine the 
thorn and have many meetings concerning the best method of 
removal. Unfortunately while debating they are merely adding 
to the thorn's dimensions, for agreement is most unlikely. 
What then is the approach, and why do the experts 
encounter so much difficulty deciding on the therapy to be 
used? One student of the problem has offered a very simple 
explanation, which most practitioners have so far failed to 
perceive. He states: 
Conflict over information policy is an inevitable 
by-product of the democratic process. The point at 
Which a proper balance is achieved between disclosure 
and secrecy will always be debated by groups with 
conflicting responsibilities and contrasting per-
spectivea.I3 
If conflict is indeed inevitable--and history gives 
definite support to the hypothesis--then the solution lies 
not in removing the thorn but in learning to live with it. 
'l'o pursue the analogy for a moment more, what is needed is 
treatment which will deaden the pain without paralyzing 
13Harry H. Ransom, Government Secrecy ~nd National 
Security: An Anal ysis, Serial No. 123, Harvard University 
Defense Policy Seminar, January 6, 1958, p. 10 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
15 
a portion of the body. 
It is important to point out here that there are other 
dichotomies as significant as disclosure vis-a-vis secrecy to 
be considered in structuring an informational policy. Under 
organization there is the question of centralization vs. 
decentralization and the effects of each on efficiency, 
economy, and adequate control. Under the heading of release 
of information there is the issue of action vs. reaction, 
i.e., whether to initiate and maintain a constant flow of in-
formation or restrict activity to the answering of queries. 
Obviously there are a number of such choices to be 
made before finally arriving at what is normally thought of 
as a policy. The problem takes on additional complexity 
when the mission of such an organization is given specifi-
city--how much time, money, and man-power can be afforded to 
gain what objectives. 
For example, perhaps all of the figures would change 
if one of the expressed purposes of the program was to 
attract, and retain high caliber personnel--while keeping 
the public informed. In long-range policy planning, insti-
tutional, or accessory objectives such as this, though 
important, are often overshadowed by the more immediate 
needs demanding attention. 
This background, while intended t o introduce the 
development of the study, may also serve t o engender in the 
reader some feeli ng of commiseration for the people, both in 
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and out of government, who must wrestle periodically with 
these problems. 
In the forefront of this group are the members of 
Congress, who during the last ten years have played with 
considerable spirit the paternal role of questioning, 
watching, hoping, and waiting for the youngster that is 
unified military public relations to work out his own 
salvation. However, unlike a father's duty, it is not the 
job of Congress to gui~e, but rather to chide. 
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Congre·ssional influence and control does, after all, 
have a negative aspect, in that its members are not respon-
sible for--indeed, do not have the time or the staff for--
determining the most effective method of operating a given 
government agency. 
As watchdogs and holders of the purse-strings, they 
can, however, limit, prevent, and even eliminate if in their 
opinion things are not being rqn properly. Perbaps the best 
barometer of their confidence or displeasure is the size of 
the appropriation; whether it is increased, remains the same, 
or is trimmed, and under what circumstances. 
As mentioned earlier, by this measurement military 
public relations has not fared ~t all well. Each year there 
has been a little less patience ••• and a little leas money. 
In fact, in the minds of many, it is BQ! only a token 
activity and could not be reduced further without Press 
and/or public repercussions. 
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The hypothesis. Considering the framework thus far, 
it is believed that the present limitation of funds imposed 
by Congress on the public relations activities of the 
military services and the Department of Defense is a mani-
festation of their displeasure with the conduct of these 
activities. 
Purpose of the study. In addition to testing the 
hypothesis, it is the purpose of this study to ascertain 
as clearly as possible, on the basis of statements as ex-
pressed in publications, what Congress as a body thinks of 
military public relations. 
Significance of the study. Most Americans have seen 
demonstrated, or through training have grown to believe in, 
the power of the individual citizen as an integral part of 
public opinion in our democratic society. Next to the force 
of public opinion itself probably the most dynamic, represent-
ative, and influential group in the world today is the Congress 
of the United States. 
What Congress thinks of military public relations must 
of necessity have some significance to the profession as a 
whole. In addition, it is hoped that the results of this 
study may prove useful to military public relations officers 
in dealing with Congress, and in planning realistically for 
future information programs. 
Congressional opinion will always be directly related 
to such planning in terms of money, personnel, and opera-
tional scope. 
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If the purpose of the study, as stated, is realized, 
the testimony which follows should provide enough specific 
information to allow the reader to answer some of the 
pertinent questions to his own satisfaction. The signifi-
cance of the answers will necessarily depend on the reader's 
orientation, special interest, and individual frame of 
reference. 
1. Does the Congress appear to be generally 
familiar with themanagerial function of public 
relations in an organization--especially 
military? 
2. Does Congress make any distinction between 
a planned public relations program, and a 
policy of public information, i.e., answering 
queries, preparing stories, pictures and 
captions for release? 
3. Do Congressmen generally favor more disclosure 
or more security? 
4. Is Congress well informed on the extent of 
public relations activities conducted in the 
"field" b~ the services? 
5. What do Congressmen like a nd/or dislike about 
past and present public rel ati ons programs? 
6. Does their opinion--good or bad-- hold for all 
public relations activity, mili t ary and 
civilian? 
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7. What are the major areas of congressional 
opinion on military public relations, i.e., what 
items do they seem most concerned aboutt 
8. Does their opinion reflect the opinion of their 
constituentst 
9. Does Congress approved or disapprove of the 
present organization of the Office of Public 
Affairs? 
10. What does Congress think of the administration 
of the public information program? 
11. How does Congress feel it is treated by military 
public relations personnel? 
12. Is Congress satisfied with the amount, type, and 
speed of information furnished it by military 
public relations people? 
13. Does Congress believe the present limitation is 
realistic and can be administered without abuse? 
14. Why does Oongress feel as it does about military 
public relations--how strongly? 
Sources. This study is based primarily on information 
taken from published transcripts of hearings, conducted by 
both houses of Congress, on appropriations for the Department 
ot Defense over the past six years. 
In addition, the hearings and reports of the House 
Subcommittee, investigating the Availability of Information 
From Federal Departments and Agencies, known as the Moss 
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Committee, served as a valuable source of opinion and in-
formation on the subject. 
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Methodology. The organ1zation of the material from 
these sources was divided into five major steps: (1) the 
extraction of all testimony, prepared statements, and data, 
concerning military public relations, (2) consolidation of 
all the statements of each Congressman concerned in a 
separate folio, (~) examination of each Congressman 1 a folio, 
and listing of the different opinions expressed, (4) 
categorization of the separate opinions into major areas 
which evolved, (5) tabulation of total number of occurrences 
of opinion in each major area. 
It is the intent of this study to do no more than 
summarize the material in each section. Conclusions drawn, 
will then be the reader's and Will be based on the actual 
statements made by the Members of Congress, rather than the 
investigator's interpretation of the statements. 
Sample. While not scientifically selected, the 
congressional sample used for the study was found to be 
highly representative geographically, politically, and 
... 1~ h l 15 
even by sex when compared to the population as a w o e. 
14The word ''population" is used here in the survey 
design sense and refers to the Congress. 
15see APPENDIX B., Congressional Sample. 
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Limitations. There were a variety of limitations 
imposed on the investigator from the start--which could 
only be accepted. 
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While the sample is believed representative and large 
enough for the purpose to satisfy research requirements 
( 5. 4 peroen t), there is no doubt some sampling error, i.e., 
an amount of difference between the opinions of the 
Congressmen in the sample and the opinions of the population, 
caused by chance. 
In a well controlled research design the chance of 
error would be kept to a very low percentage, e.g., the 
researcher would be 95 percent sure that the opinion of his 
sample correctly represented the opinion of his population. 
Because the sample in this case was not selected 
randomly, and for a number of other more technical reasons, 
the validity--degree to which the study measures what it is 
supposed to measure--cannot be unequivocally determined or 
stated. 
On the other hand, there is no apparent deviation in 
the sample norm which would indicate, or suggest, a large 
sampling error. 
There are other, perhaps mare obvious, limitations. 
One, is the overlapping of opinion areas; another is the 
difficulty encountered in attempting to accurately reduce 
two or three pages of questioning and testimony to one 
statement. Yet, it is often near impossible to extract a 
needed quote without changing the context at the same time. 
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The tabulation of the number of times an opinion 
occurs defies objectivity, and makes the procedure much too 
arbitrary. For example, one reasonably short statement can 
show concern and/or contain opinions in three or four 
different areas. This trouble is compounded by the fact 
that oftentimes the opinion is never really verbalized, 
and is rather an attitude, clearly inferred over a number 
of pages, from which you can deduce opinion. The enigma 
here is in illustrating the point to the reader. 
The last, but not the least important of the limita-
tions of this study (or any study), is the personal bias of 
the investigator. It is an accepted fact that each indivi-
dual apprehends the world about him in a different way, tends 
to be selective in what he is attentive to, and what he 
observes, according to past learning and experience. 
This selective perception implies that what a person 
sees, to a large extent, depends upon what opinions he 
already holds. 
The investigator, being fully aware of this "human~ 
limitation has made~ery effort to minimize it by organ-
izing perceptions, in so far as possible, objectively. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CONGRESSIONAL OPINION 
The major areas of opinion which follow are not 
arranged in order of frequency of comment, importance of 
subject, or amount of material available on a particular 
subject. There is no special order, other than that which 
seemed most logical for the purposes of presentation. 
In this vein, an attempt has been made to predeter-
mine the questions of the reader with the hope of 
achieving as much 11flow" as possible in placing congress-
ional opinion on this subject at his disposal. 
I. GENERAL FAMILIARITY 
WITH MILITARY PUBLIC RELATIONS 
If a man is a carpenter, and he meets a man who is 
not a carpenter, it does not take him very long to ascertain 
this fact. The degree of familiarity with the subject is 
soon evident--especially when the purpose of the meeting is 
the discussion of the subject. 
This is by way of saying, that to a person familiar 
with public relations, military and otherwise, it is not 
difficult to broadly assess a Congressman's acquaintance 
with the subject, provided he expresse s himsel f . 
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In this area there were 74 such expressions which 
have been divided into three topics. The first, of which, 
concerns the definition of military public information and 
its functions. 
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Senator Joseph C. 0 1Mahoney, of Wyoming, speaking to 
one of the Deputy Secretaries and Mr. Andrew H. Barding, 
then Director of the Office of Public Information, 
diagnosed the problem as follows: 
The trouble ••• is that for some reason or another 
the functions of the Office of Public Information 
have not been adequately explained to the Members 
of Congress. Too many members have the idea that 
this is a propaganda agency for the purpose of 
affecting the judgement of Members of Congress and 
the judgement of the people rather than for the 
distribution of essential information with respect 
to what is going on. 
I think, Mr. Berding, you have an opportunity now 
to demonstrate the acumen of those who chose you 
for this place, by making a clear and incisive 
account of what the Office of Public I£fomation 
ought to do and why it ought to exist. 
After being told, to some general extent, of the 
activities of the Office by Mr. Berding, the Senator 
commented: 
You see, one of your troubles is that this is all 
lumped under public information. In other words, 
the Department of Defense, before you came with it, 
chose the worst possible headline they could choose 
lunited States Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 
1953, Hearings before Subcommittee, 82d Congress, 2d 
Session, on H.R. 7391, February 4-June 21, 1952 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 1276. 
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to explain this function. So p~ease break this 
down into the exact categories. 
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Pursuing this idea even further, presumably in hopes 
of clarifying the definition for his colleagues, the Senator, 
later in the same exchange said: 
Mr. Barding, may I suggest to you an assignment 
that may prove helpful ••• Suppose :rr·ou write a 
feature story of 750 words on a day in the life of 
the Director of Public Information and put it in 
here.3 (referring to the Hearing transcript). 
This lack of definition in the minds of the members of 
Congress as to exactly what public information or public re-
lations consists of is somewhat widespread. Even Congressman 
Edward T. Miller, of Maryland, who shows more than cursory 
knowledge of the subject during the hearings, was prompted 
to confess: 
I am afraid I am a little confused •••• Maybe I have a 
different idea as to what public relations consists of 
than your department.4 
I believe I have said, ••• that it seemed to me rather 
important for this committee, in deciding what we 
would consider reasonable expenditures on the public-
information program to have a definition of just what 
public relations consists.5 
Senator Dennis Chavez, of New Mexico, on another 
occasion, speaking to Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
2 Ibid., p. 1278. ~ Ibid., p. 1284 
4united States Congress, House, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 
1956, Hearings before Subcommittee, 84th Congress, 1st 
Session, January ~1-April 19, 1955 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 657. 
5 Ibid., p. 660 
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Legislative and Public Affairs, Robert Ross, asked, 
M •••• What is the main function of the Service? What do you 
do'l 6 
Senator 0 1Mahoney, like Senator Homer Ferguson, of 
Michigan, seemed to think the subject would be more manage-
able if there was some definition on the record. He also 
asked Mr. Berding: 
Will you state on the record what you deem to be 
the function of this personnel; public relations? 
What are you aiming at and what do you feel is the 
function? 
What categories do you try to cover'l 7 
In speaking of the budget, on still another occasion, 
Mr. Berding was asked by Senator Margaret Chase Smith, of 
Maine: 
Mr. Chairman, may I ask what this specifically covers, 
what is included in public relations. 
I would like at some time to have a few examples of 
what comes under public relations.B 
The second topic concerns the apparent confusion of 
6united States Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 
1956, Hearings before Subcommittee, 84th Congress, lst 
Session, on H. R. 6042, April 4-June 6, 1955 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 1369. 
7 United States Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 
1954 1 Hearings before Subcommittee, 83d Congress, 1st 
Session, Part I, on H.R. 5969, May 19-June 18 1 1953 
_(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 660. 
8 United States Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 
1954, Hearings before Subcommittee, 83d Congress, lst 
Session, Part II, on H.R. 5969, June 18-Ju1y 10, 1953 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 1850. 
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the Office of Public Information with two other government 
agencies. 
For example, in the 1956 Senate Hearings, conducted for 
the Office of Public Information budget, Senator Chevez noted 
that the Army, Navy, and Air Force publish more than ninety 
magazines, notices, newsletters, etc. The publications 
which he referred to were internal, supported by the 
Information and Education program, and were in no way 
1', '·' 
connected with military public information. He and Senator 
Allen J. Ellender, of Louisiana, however, ostensibly felt 
that the publications were a public information matter. 
Both Senators questioned Mr. Ross about the cost of the 
publications, the unification of the Information and 
Education effort, who headed the organization, whether it 
was unified with Public Information, and the nature of the 
operation. Understandably, in this instance, Mr. Ross was 
unable to supply the information. 
Mr. J. B.. Loftis, Director, Office of Administrative 
Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, eventually 
filled the breech by explaining that the Information and 
Education program was Mslanted toward morale and welfare 
and education of the Armed Forces personnel, whereas the 
public information program (was) slanted toward informing 
the general publio.~9 
9senate Hearings, 1956, op. cit., pp. 428-431. 
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Later in the same hearings Senator Leverett 
Saltonetall, of Massachusetts, speaking of the same 
publications said, 1It is your job to see that there is 
not duplication and that there is not an unnecessary 
number of publications?M Mr. Ross again answered that the 
magazines referred to were those prepared to provide in-
formation to the troops, and were not under his juris-
diction. 
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The other government agencies mentioned by Congress-
men as overlapping or duplicating public information 
activities was the Armed Farces Radio and Television 
Service, whioh provides entertainment to forces overseas. 
Topic number three in this section is a catch-all, 
actually a review of some of the miscellaneous questions 
asked which indicate the degree of familiarity with the 
subject. 10 
· It would seem that some of the committee members had 
never received aid from the public information office; 
one asked, "Does your office handle inquiries from Congress"' 10 
Another: 
•••• you made several references to the services performed 
for the members of Congress on the queries made by the 
Congreesmen •••• but it was not clear to me just what the 
Members of Congress really receive from your people or 
want from your Office of Public Information. 
lOAlthough each question is accurately quoted, no 
attempt will be made to identify the individual Congressman. 
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On the same subject still another states: "Frankly 
it would never occur to me that correspondence with a Member 
of Congress should be looked upon as public relations." 
A not uncommon subject is: ''Does your office have 
anything to do with classification of papers?" "Does your 
office have anything to do with declassifying records or 
documents?" "Is classified material made available to your 
office? 11 
One Member sums up: 
•••• My experience here has indicated that our difficulty 
apparently has its origin at the source of determination 
of what should be classified and what should not be 
classified. Where is that authority vested, if I may 
ask? 
On another bent; while discussing the budget one 
House Member asked, "Does this include recruiting activities?" 
He was not alone in this doubt. At least two others had 
asked the question before. 
"What is the justification for the department to make 
movies and to present television programs?" This is apparently 
a sore spot with a few Members of Congress. Another wanted 
to know, "Is the cost of these movies borne by your $500,000?" 
At least one felt the government was not coming out 
well financially with such an arrangement, he asked, "You 
give it to the newsreel people free of charge? Then you 
go down there to see your own picture and they charge you for 
entrance; is that it?" Others displayed interest in who 
reviewed television and radio programs. 
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In another exchange about personnel needed for the 
military public relations offices one Senator asked, "Who 
handles this information service? Is it civilians or people 
in the Army or Navy or Air Force?" 
And then there were such questions as these: 
"Is the mailing of notices, statements, and so forth 
under your department?" 
"What are your duties in regard to the morale and 
welfare projects?" 
"Do you hand out to the newspapers information that 
you think should be made for general circulation?" 
"For instance, there is an airbase in Kansas or 
elsewhere. Do you have this kind of personnel there, 
too, for information?" 
11 Do you have any responsibility or connection with 
any of the cold war propaganda programs •••• ? 111 
'
0Is it the duty . of your office to run down security 
leaks? 10 
And last, but not less frequent, the question about 
what kind of informat i on is released: ''Is it propaganda?" 
Under no circumstances should the reader be mistakenly 
led to believe that it is the purpose of the investigator 
to imply, or any way convey, the idea that it is the fault of 
the Members of Congress that t hey ar e not entirel y familiar 
with the public information activities o:r the Department of 
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Defense. Nor is the quoting of the more extreme questions 
meant to suggest that they represent anything less than an 
earnest desire on the part bf the questioners to get all 
the information possible before making a decision. 
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The general familiarity of Congress with military 
public relations is, of course, not entirely negative. 
However, there is very little published comment in the 
sources used to illustrate the extent of the positive know-
ledge or view. It is an unknown. 
There are certainly not more than two or three state-
ments which suggest insight, experience, or training in the 
field. One of them was made by Congressman Miller who said: 
I have had the idea that public relations was to cover 
the functions that normally have been carried on by 
military personnel in getting out newspaper releases 
and taking certain cognizance of community requirements 
in areas where there are military installations, and 
what you might call an advertising program, if possible, 
to put the services in as good a light and on as 
friendly relations with the general public as possible.ll 
To review; it would seem that the majority of the 
Members of Congress are not generally familiar with the 
definitions, functions, boundaries, scope, services, 
responsibilities, or organization of the various offices of 
military public relations. 
11House Hearings, 1956, £2• cit., p. 657. 
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If this is assumed to be true, then it is as easily 
assumed that Members of Congress cannot be expected to 
place any great value on the operations of these offices. 
II. ORGANIZATION OF 
MILITARY PUBLIC RELATIONS COMMUNITY 
32 
There is a surprising concentration and consensus of 
opinion on two organizational aspects of the military public 
relations community: coordination and control. 
Because the two principles are complementary and the 
other comments of the total of 70, are either related or 
isolated, no effort will be made to subdivide within the 
section. 
As might be expected there are a number of entries 
in the record questioning how the Office is organized. 
Congressman Glenn R. Davis, of Wisconsin, speaking to the 
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, opened with: 
My general question is this: Where do you fit in with 
respect to the other public relations offices or offices 
of information of the three different branches of the 
service? What kind of surveillance or censorship or 
supervision, or whatever you want to call it, do you 
exercise over them?l2 
Just slightly more aggressive, Senator Smith mused: 
•••• while I appreciate the value (of public relations) 
and know something about it, it always seemed to me that 
there could be a considerable saving and less overlappin~ 
than there is in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I3 
12Ibid., p . 663. 
13senate Hearings, 1954, Part II, £2· cit., p. 1850. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
In speaking of the judgement required in deciding 
what is of a security nature and what is not, Congressman 
John J. Riley, of South Carolina, said: 
There ought to be some criteria to guide the judgement 
of these folks, because sometimes we have information 
from people in the field that you perhaps here feel 
should not be given out. I think probably we have had 
s orne of that .1.-1 
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Senator Ferguson also wanted to know, MHow much 
duplication is there in these officee? 1115 He was speaking 
of all the public information offices. Earlier in the same 
hearings he asked: 
Is there not something that can be done to concentrate 
your public relations in Washington so that the people 
can really get this picture on this defense?l6 
More positive is Congressman Richard B. Wigglesworth, 
of Massachusett.s, who has had quite a bit to say on the 
subject: 
Mr. Berding, I think one of the main reasons for 
setting up this office (Office of Public Information, 
Department of Defense) was to secure a reduction and 
coordination of effort as compare~7with that which had exis t ed before it was set up. 
l4united States Congress, House, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 
1958, Hearings before Subcommittee, 85th Congress, lst 
Session, Part II, February 27-April 3, 1957 (Washington: 
Government Pr inting Off ice , 1957), p. 1827. 
15senate Hearings, 1954, Part I, 22• ci t ., p. 659. 
16Ibid.' p. 159 
17United States Congress, House , Committee on 
Appropriations , Department of Defens e Appropriations for 
1954, Heari ngs before Subcommitt ee, 83d Congress, let-~ 
Session, February 24-June 16, 1953 (Washington : 
Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 612. 
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I am still not quite clear in my mind as to what control, 
if any, the Office of Public Affairs in Washington exer-
cises over the photographs or exhibits or public state-
mentB or other informational activities of the three 
separate branches of the military setup.l8 
I do not say that the services have done it deliberately, 
but experience indicated that individuals in the so-
called Public Information Service have not had in the 
past the proper appreciation of what should and what 
should not be published, and that we have not had a 
proper system of control over public information.19 
He also complained about the frequent release of 
information to the Press which had been presented as secret 
to the Committee, observing that: 
Naturally, it leads to the conclusion that there is a 
lack of coordination somewhere along the line. I do 
not know whether that is the responsibility of your 
office or where the responsibility lies.20 
While on the subject of security review Mr. Wiggles-
worth during another hearing rather paradoxically gives his 
view on the organization of such an office: 
Of course, somebody has to consider things from the 
security angle, but I would not think that you wo~ld 
have to have set up a special division for that.2 
In the same exchange he asked of Mr. Berding: MWhy 
shou+d we have to set up an activity in the Department of 
Defense to maintain lia i son with national organizations?~ 
18House Hearings, 1958, Part II, 22• cit., p. 1830 
19united States Congress, House, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense APpropriations for 
1955 1 Hearings before Subcomittee, 83d Congres s , 2d 
Session, February 1-April 1, 1954 (Wa sh i ngt on : 
Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 550. 
20House Hearings, 1958, Part II, 1oc. cit. 
21Houae Hearings, 1954, 22• cit., p. 613. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
35 
Congressman Erret P. Scrivner, of Kansas, engaged 
Mr. Philip K. Allen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public 
Affairs in a pithy exchange by interrupting with: 
Let's stop here. 
You say you try. 
the services? 
What authority do you have? 
What authority do you have over 
Mr. Allen~ We have the authority of releasing or 
not releasing photographs, announcements, and 
similar documents. We have the authority to 
delete sections from speeches made by both 
civilian and military. 
Mr. Scrivner: If you get to see them first. 
Mr. Allen: I do not know of many speeches by key 
officials which we have not seen, sir. 
Mr. Scrivner~ If you had seen some I have read 
and put your O.K. on them, you are more to blame 
than the man who makes them.22 
Speaking to Mr. Swan, Congressman Gerald R. Ford, 
Jr., of Michi gan, finished a discussion with these words of 
warning: 
After all, you are the experts on this operation. 
Unless you coordinate what each of the three services 
is doing the~ can go off in three totally different 
directionso23 
Congres sman Miller had a rather simplified idea of 
how the Office could be organized; in a reminiscent mood he 
said: 
I thought the old days in the Army, when we had maybe 
one fellow who in addition to his other duties was 
looked upon as the lieutenant or captain who talked 
22House Hearings, 1958, Part II, ..QE.• cit., p. 1834. 
23House , H~&rings, 1956 1 £2• cit ., p. 657o 
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to the press, were days when we had better public 
relations than we have now, with all these experts. 24 
36 
In the same hearing in a discussion of Department of 
Defense public relations, Mr. Miller commented: 
I would hope that it be limited to a narrow base. 
I think that is what most of us have contemplated 
when we were urging a limitation on public relations 
epending.::;:5 
The most incisive work in this major area was without 
a doubt done by the Moss Committee which devoted many hours 
--and hundreds of pages of testimony--to the specific study 
of the Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs. 
Selected opinions of Congressmen on the Committee 
could, and have already, filled a book. However, certain 
key findings were contained in a report of the Committee 
which related di rectly to the organization of the Office 
of Public Affairs and this section. Some of these will be 
quoted here as well as some of the final, or summarizing, 
testimony from the actual hearings. 
Under the subject heading, Control of Information 
Polici es and Practices, the repor t states: 
At the outs et of the hearings, Mr. Ross quoted from 
Defense Department memoranda and directives to show 
that hi s office had been assigned "responsibility 
for public informatio n act ivities of the Department 
of Defense" and that the Def e n~e Department Office 
of Public Information, under Mr. Ross ' direction , 
had been named 10 the sole agency f or the Nati onal 
Military Establishment at the seat of Government for 
dissemination of information t o media of public 
information . **•~ Asked if he fel t the need for 
additiona l authori ty , Mr. Ross replied : 
24 b . I id., p. 658. 25 I bido 1 Po 661. 
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I feel we do have the authority to get the job 
done (hearing transcript, July 9, 1956). 
Under questi oning the following day, however, Mr. 
Ross and his aides stated that: 
37 
Other agencies in the department may withhold informa-
tion without his office's ever hearing of such with-
holding. 
In at least one case, the Navy Departmen t twi ce 
refused to answer requests by Ross' office that 
a proposed magazine article considered objectionable 
by the Navy be passed along to Mr. Ross' office for 
review of the objectionable ruling. 
Mr. Ross' office did not prepare Secretary Wilson's 
memorandum of March 29, 1955, suggesting a sweeping 
reorganization of Defens e Department information 
activitie s nor has Mr. Ross received any written 
reports of what has been done to imp lement that 
memorandum. Mr. Roes has been verbally informed of 
recommendations made under the memorandum by the 
three branches of the Armed Forces. These recommenda-
tions were made directly to the Secretary, but only 
verbally. 
Mr. Ross was ~not generally familiar~ with the public 
information background, if any, of the ch~gfs of 
public information in the three services. 
During the hearings Congressman John E. Moss, of 
California, in the discussion of the Navy 1 s refusal to 
answer requests, said: 
I think if we are going to have the Navy in the 
position of being able to censor history, we will 
have to have more effective controls than are 
evident here, or we are going to have quite a rich 
26 United States Congress, House, Committee on 
Government Operations, Availability of Information From 
Federal Departments and Agencies, 25th Intermediate Report, 
84th Congress, 2d Session, House Repor t No. 2947, July 27, 
1956 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 195 6). p. 33. 
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fie ld of information permanently witliliel d from the 
American people.27 
38 
After ninety pages of examination a nd cross-examina-
tion of Mr. Ross by Committee members--c overi ng every area 
mentioned in this study--Congressman Dante B. Fascell , of 
Florida, with some exasperation, attempted t o pinpoint the 
matter of centralized control: 
Then what this boils down to, Mr. Ross, is that 
unless a mat ter i s specifically brought to the 
attention of your office, either by the service 
or by somebody outside, it just never gets t here? 
Mr. Ross: I think you will have t o explain the 
question further, Mr. Fascell . I do n ' t s ee its 
relation to this memorandum. 
Mr. Fascell : Well, we are talki ng about reorgan-
izing the plan of publ i c information a c t ivity . 
Mr. Ross : Yes, sir. 
Mr. Fascel l g In which there is a chain of command, 
or a channel. From all the test i mony I have heard, 
the channel never gets any further than the top of 
the services. If they want to submit it to you, 
they do. If they don't they d on 1 t . If they want to 
releas e something, t hey release it . If they don't, 
they don ' t . 
The appointment of a civilian as chief will be made, 
you hope , or the Secretary hopes , some time in the 
future . But , as a matter of f a ct , the servi ces do not 
see it that way, so in al l probability they won 't 
appoint civilian chiefs. 
27united States Congress, House, Committee on 
Government Operations, Availability of I nf ormation From 
Federal Departments a nd Agencies, Part 5-Depar tment of 
Defense, lst Section, Hearings befor·e Subcommi ttee , 84th 
Congress, 2d Session , July 9, 10, a nd 1 2 , 1956 (Washington g 
Government Printing Office , 1956), p . 991. 
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Now, I am just wondering how you are going to improve 
the effectiveness of the program, this memorandum 
suggests, if that is actually the situation? 
Mr. Ross: All t h e information prepared for release, 
which is released by the Department of Defense, is 
released through our office and by our office. 
Mr. Fascell: I understand that, but suppose it isn't 
released by the Department of Defense, that is what I 
am getting at. 
Mr. Ross: Then it doesn't get released. 
Mr. Mithcell: In other words, the Departments of 
the Navy, Army, and Air Force do not release anything 
on their own? 
Mr. Rose: It is released through the Office of Public 
Information in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
Mr. Fascell: But t h e point of this ·thing, Mr. Ross, 
is that i f it never gets pas t the service to start 
with you don 't see it, so how can you approve it for 
release1 
Mr. Ross: Well, that is accurate, sir . 
Mr. Fascell: Thank you. 
Now, we understand each other. 
Mr. Ros s : On that particular point; yes, s ir.28 
Still on the subject of control , and authority to 
override service author ity if necessary , Mr. Fascell t h en 
concluded : 
Then that leaves one big loophole, do es it not , and 
tha t is if any inquiry for inf ormation is made to a 
servic e , and that information ia refused , it never 
comes to your attenti on unless the would-be recipient 
brings t he matter to your office? 
28Ib1d., p. 1 006. 
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Mr. Ross: That would be accurate, yes. 
Mr. Fascell: And am I correct, now, in understanding 
that you have the authority to override prior disap-
proval? An inquiry is made to a service for information, 
or for release of information. The service officer re-
fuses it. The would-be recipient then comes to your 
office, and my question was, do you have the authority 
to override the disapproval? 
Mr. Rose: I do not know that I have the authority to 
overrule the service. 
Mr. Fascell: Can you order service to release the 
information? 
29 I do not believe s o, sir. 
At _the end of this exchange Mr. Moss verbally threw 
up his hands, etating: 
Well, I wanted to get int o some cases but at the 
moment I find I am completely confused. Because 
we have explained away, in my judgement, all of 
your authori ty. We first spread it on the record, 
and we have now explained it away. 
There must be some definite authority delegated to 
you in your capacity as Head of the Office of 
Legislative and Public Affairs, and t hat must be a 
fi~~~ authority and a final responsibility==final, 
except as the Secretary himself might act to override 
you. 
I think at this point the record would bear me out 
that we have created a p icture of complete confueion.30 
The Committee Report summed up this testimony as 
follows: 
Mr. Ross• office is not the sole authority for deter-
mining whether or not information will be withheld; 
and, in fact, Mr. Ross does not believe he has the 
authority to overrule a refusal to release informa-
tion by any of the three services . He stated that the 
29Ibid., p . 1015. 30 Ibid. I p. 1016. 
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Secretary of Defense could overrule such a decision, 
but admit ted he had no knowledge of such a case ever 
having aris en. 
There is no directive requiri ng t h e Secretaries of 
the t hree services to ~collaborate~ !ith Ross 1 office 
(hearing transcript, July 10, 1956). 
41 
Just before adjourning the Ross portion of the Hear-
ings, classification was discussed--als o to the apparent 
dissatisfaction of the members. The mood of the Committee 
and the congressional opinion of the policies and practices 
of the Office of Public Affai rs were ~classically~ 
described toward the end of the day by Mr. Fascell in a 
questi on to Mr. Ross : 
Don 1 t you feel that th is whole rna tter of information, 
policy, class ification, a nd what not has become · 
reduc tio ad absurdum, ad infinitum, a nd ad nauseum?32 
Mr. Ross, wi th some petulance, replied, "I won't 
answer that s ir.~ 
Section one of this chapter indicated that Members 
of Congre ss were not too familiar generally with military 
public relations and that this would seem to be detrimental 
to the succ ess of the program. 
The research done here however , under the heading of 
Organization , leaves the impr ess ion tha t , at least on this 
subject, familiarity should have been carefully a voided , for 
instead of breeding confidence a nd understanding , it only 
bred contempt . 
31House Report No. 2947 , July 27 , 1956, loc . cit. 
32Ibid., p. 1036 . 
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III. ECONOMY OF OPERATION 
Because the study source material is drawn almost 
exclusively from appropriation hearings each transcript hae 
at its base the Congressman's historical duty to protect the 
taxpayer's dollar. This duty is perceived in different waye 
by different Congressmen--which ie what makes the life of 
the Executive Branch resonant. 
A limitation on funds for public information 
activities in the Department of Defense first appeared in 
the Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1951, Public Law 179, 
82nd Congress, First Session. The law provided, in part, 
u •••• that expenditures of appropriations contained in this 
act for public information activit ies of the Department of 
Defense shall not exceed $10,950,000 including pay and 
allowances of military personnel •••• 10 
In the halcyon days of 1952, the military services 
and the still new Office of Public Information spent $10,245,345 
for military public relatione activities.33 
Beginning in 1953 , a much stricter limitation wae im-
posed by Congress on the amount of money which could be 
expended by the military establishment for public information 
activities. Tha t year $5,554,851 was spent . 
33Approximately two hundredth! of one percent of the 
thirty-nine billion dollars spent on national defense that 
year. 
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In subsequent years the limit was reduced to four 
and one half million, then three and one half, and finally 
in 1957 to $3,270 1 000. 
The reasoning behind the original limitation concept 
is reflected in a House Report on the appropriations bill 
submitted for fiscal 1954. The wording indicates that the 
Report is a consensus of opinion of the nine Congressmen 
involved, and consequently ia regarded ae doubly valuable 
to this study. 
The excerpt begins with an explanation of the House 
cut recommended for the Office of Publ i c Information at the 
seat of government. It is the justification which follows 
that imparts congressional attitude toward the Office: 
The bill included for this item the amount of $400 1 000, 
a reduction of $100 1 000 under the revised estimates, 
and $150,000 under the appropriation for the fiscal 
year 1953. The committee feels that all public infor-
mation activities within the Department of Defense should 
be more closely correlated, and it knows of no better 
method than a reduction in a'P'i)"ropria ti one-.-( italics not 
in the original) 
The commi ttee feels confident that i f this office 
divests it self of some of the fringe activities which 
really do not contribute to the serving of the public 
or the Congress a nd retains only those activities 
which actual l y contribute to a better understanding 
of the Department and its responsibilities, it will 
find tha t the amount re c ommended i n the accompanying 
bill will be adequate.34 
34united St ates Congress, Houae , Comm i ttee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 
1954, 83d Congress, l et Session, House Rep or t No. 680 1 June 27, 1953 (Waahington : Government Printing Office, 
1953). 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
44 
The fo l lowing month, July of 195~ 1 Mr. Berding, in 
the hearing before the Senate, addressed Senator Ferguson : 
Senator, we are here to reclaim the $100,000 cut by the 
House. We feel that restoration of this sum is necessary. 
We came to Congress with what we thought was a rock-
bottom budge t •••• We met the new desire for rigid economy 
by cutting one third off our budget, a nd came up with 
$500,000; $1001 000 has been cut from that budget, and it 
is going t o mean a serious cut in our f acilities. 
Senator Ferguson: Does this cover just the public 
relatione in the Secretary's Office? 
Mr. Berding: For the Department of Defense at the 
seat of government. 
Senator Ferguson: Would this cover a field operation? 
Mr. Berding: No; it does not. We have no field 
operat ions under my office. They would be covered 
under the $5 million overall limitation. 
Senator Ferguson : I was wondering i f we gave you the 
right t o transfer $100,000 out of that if you could 
not save it out of there, and use it in yours. 
Mr. Berding: That is the overall expenditure limitation 
of $5 million for the Department of Defense. I do not 
want to cut into the services ••• ~ 
Senator Ferguson : I personally feel that you got too 
much money out in the field. I think that there is a 
lot of so=called public relations in the field that you 
could cu t down on.35 
In this last statement, t h e Senator from Michigan 
expressed a n addi tional congressional opinion which led t o 
the one mill ion dollar reduction the f ollowing year. 
Perhaps there are always pol itical overtones in the 
hearings, however , direct mention is infrequent . In a prior 
35senate Hearings , 1954, Part II , .212.• cit ., pp. 1849-
1850. 
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exchange the same year, Senator Ferguson asked: ~How much 
was the Eisenhower budget below the Truman budget?~ Mr. 
Berding replied: 
It is $250,00 below the Truman budget. In order to 
restore some •••• round the clock service, we put it 
in the Truman budget for $750 1 000. Then realizing 
that there is a great desire for economy, we cut 
that by one~third and brought it down to $500 1 000 
from $75o,ooo.36 
Senator Carl Hayden, of Arizona, following the same 
discussion, wanted some clarification of how a limitation 
is administered: 
Is this $5 million that the chairman (Ferguson) 
mentioned a limitation or appropriation? 
Mr. Barding: It is a limitation. 
Senator Hayden: You cannot take money out of limitations. 
Mr. Garlock: (Deputy Controller for Budget, Office of 
Secretary of Defense) Senator, the funds for public 
information activities exist in military personnel 
appropriations in the three military departments under 
maintenance and operation. The limitation you are 
speaking of is strictly a limitation on the use of 
money for this purpose.37 
On March 31, 1954, Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of 
Defense made what might be termed an historic fiscal state-
ment for a member of the Executive Branch--at the same time 
accelerating the down-hill trend of military public relations 
operational scope. 
36senate Hearings, 1954, Part I., £2· cit., p. 661. 
37senate Hearings, 1954, Part II, ~· cit., p. 1851. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
46 
Speaking to a pleasantly surprised budget cutting 
House Committee, Mr. Wilson began: 
I would like to talk to the committee about the 
manner in which we propose to revise and improve 
the public information part of our activities in 
the Department of Defense, particularly here in 
Washington • 
•••• I think that it is essential that we have an 
organization here in Washington for this purpose, 
properly organized and staffed by competent people. 
We intend to make news more readily available to the 
Congress and the people, eliminate duplication and 
inefficiency, (italics not in the original) and do 
this job at less cost to the taxpayer. 
It is my conviction, based upon the experience of 
the past year, that we can carry out this program 
with substantially less people and at less cost to 
the government than is now the case. We have secured 
the approval of the Director of the Bureau of the 
Budget a nd we now propose that your committee reduce 
the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
budget for the Office of Public Information from our 
initial request of $1 million to $500 1 000. Under the 
general provisions as now written into section ?23, 
we would recommend that the restriction on public 
information funds of $4i million per year be amended 
to provide for a maximum allowance under this restrict-
ion of $3i million per year. 
The $3i million limitation will provide for the $500 1 000 
recommended for the Office of Public Inf'ormation and for 
$1 mi llion each to the military departments.38 
Needless to say, the House Commi t te e approved the 
recommendati on, with considerable enthus iasm. For example, 
Congressman Scrivner stated: 
While it is not a big amount as compared to the entire 
budget, I do want to commend the Secre t a ry of Defense 
for the precedent he has established here in coming in 
38House Hearings, 1955 1 22• cit., pp. 543-545. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
and asking us to provide less rather than more money 
for some activity. It is a precedent which I hope 
will be followed repetitiously not by the Secretary 
only but also by other members of the Defense 
Department.39 
And Congressman Miller added: 
Mr. Secretary, I, like Mr. Scrivner, am delighted 
that we are apparently planning to operate on less 
money in this field, but I am particularly gratified 
that it is being emphasized. 
Your presence here before this committee on this 
particular item indicated the importance with which 
this matter is regarded in the department, and I have 
always thought that it was ~place where there was a 
great deal that could and should be done. (italics 
not in the original) My only comment is that I am 
delighted with the presentation of the program.40 
47 
As a military public relations officer in the field 
remarked that year (1954), Mnow we are everybody's whipping 
boy. 10 
When Mr. Loftis soon after presented a prepared 
statement to the Senate Committee which referred to the one 
million dollar reduction some confusion was understandable. 
Senator Hayde n , presumably a little perplexed, askedg 
Is this reduction of $1 million in publ i c-information 
activities below the amount authorized by the House? 
Mr. Lof tis : No sir; it is a reduction of a million 
dollars below the amount made available by Congress 
this year. The House has approved the full amount 
of the request which Secretary Wilson made, $3,500 1 000. 
39House Hearings, 1955, £E• cit., p. 557 
40Ibi d. 
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Senator Hayden: What I was trying to get at was 
whether we are going to be able to reduce the total 
of this bill by a million dollars or not. 
Mr. Loftis: No sir; that reduction has already 
been proposed and was accepted by the House.41 
This short exchange constituted approximately one-
quarter of the Senate Hearing that year. With the promise 
from Secretary Wilson of better management in the coming 
year, for less money, Congress found little to discuss. 
The next February, however, 1955, Mr. Wigglesworth, 
on the subject of the limitation, indicated that the past 
year's operations had not exactly met with his approval. 
Some comments: 
48 
What I am interested in is having the so-called public 
information and public relations work tied down to 
what I am sure the Congress had in mind in setting this 
organization up and in specifying the limitations that 
we have discussed here in dollars and cents.42 
I think the reason for the limitation in the first place 
was the feeling that there had been great abuse in the 
field of public information; •••• It was the desire to 
pull things down to manageable proportions that led to 
this limitation.43 
In questioning Mr. C. H. Schooley, Director, Office 
of Public Information, about whether the limitation was 
functioning as a system of control --if indeed the operation 
41United States Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 
1955, Hearings before Subcommittee, 83d Congress, 2d 
Session, on H. R. 8873, March 15-May 26, 1954 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 159. 
42House Hearings, 1956, £2• cit., p. 667 
43Ibid., p. 653. 
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49 
~more manageable. "How much control, if . any, do you 
have over the $3 million setups in the service.M No direct 
answer was forthcoming. 
Mr. Wigglesworth: The question I am asking ls what 
control, if any, your office has over the setups in 
the Army, Navy, or Air Force. 
Mr. Schooley: •••• (they) have very competent general 
officers assigned to these functions. 
Mr. Wigglesworth: I am asking how much control your 
office has over it. 
Mr. Schooley: As members of the Public Information 
Coordinating Council, we meet and discuss problems 
and determine policies to the best of our collective 
abilities. 
Mr. Wigglesworth: I understand that. I am trying to 
get a t your functions. Do you or do you not have 
anything to say about the setup in the Army •••• or is 
that something for the Army to decide on its own. 
Mr. Swan: The answer is that they do it themselves, 
within overall policy guidance from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. 
Mr. Wigglesworth: They do it? 
Mr. Swan~ We have policy control only. 
Mr. Wigglesworth: I know that, but I want to know what 
the pol i cy includes. Does lt extend to organization? 
Does it extend to what divisions they may have in their 
setups, or how many people they may have in each of the 
divisions? 
This tooth=pulling continued for some time before Mr. 
Wigglesworth got his answer. His final question: 
But you have no authority to compel in any instance? 
It is a matter of recommendation which they (the 
services) may or may not agree t o? 
Mr. Swan : I would say it is more a matter of 
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recommendation than to compel; yes sir. 44 
As the reader might have assumed by now, the 1956 
House Hearings were, lively, long (thirty-six pages), and 
productive, yielding more in congressional opinion than 
most other individual sources with the possible exception 
of the special Moss Committee Hearings. 
While Mr. Wigglesworth, judging from his line of 
questioning, founq that the limitation was not accomplish-
50 
ing what he, at least, had in mind, i.e., increased control 
over activities, Congressman Ford was more concerned over 
the practicality and economy of the limitation itself. He 
asked of Mr. Swan: 
Do you have any idea, Mr. Swan, how much this reporting 
system costs for each of the three respective services 
to make sure that they live within this $1 million limi-
tation? 
Rr. Swan: It has been estimated that if all charges 
for personnel assigned to public information activities 
were reported they would amount to approximately $7.2 
million. 
Mr. Ford: That leads me to this conclusion then: that 
you are-not living within the limitation. I must say 
at this point that I do not think that the limitation 
is doing the job that the Congress intended. So far as 
I am personally concerned I do not think the limitation 
should exist, because it is not practical. 
The net effect of the limitation is that there is not 
a full compliance with the intent of Congress. 
It would seem to me that we are not accomplishing what 
we want. I think personally that it i s desirable to 
44 Ibido 1 pp,. 649-650. 
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have a good public relations program in the three 
services and the Department of Defense.45 What we 
are doing is imposing false limitations, which are 
being avoided at a costly expense of both manpower 
and dollars. 
It is my opinion that any circumvention, if there is 
such, is purely unavoidable. It is completely im-
practical to take into account all of the people on 
all of the posts, camps, and stations who do some 
part of their work in public information. 
I would like the best estimate from each of the 
services as to the cost of the reporting systems. 46 
51 
The information requested by Mr. Ford was submitted 
for the record. The important first few lines read: 
The costs of administering the limitation on public 
information and public relations activities contained 
in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act are 
estimated at approximately $323,000 for the fiscal 
year 1954. 
While the cost of administering the limitation would 
appear prohibitive, and thus call for some reevaluation of 
the entire procedure, none of the Members, other than Mr. 
Ford, evidenced any further interest in the costs involved. 
The House Hearings on public information and public 
relations were finished in February, but two months later 
Senator Ohevez in the Senate Hearings had some new questions 
on the same subject for Mr. Ross. 
45This is as favorable a statement as was found on 
the general subject of public relations made by a Member 
of Congress. 
46Ibid., pp. 651-655. 
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Can you give us an explanation of why activities 
similar to those charged to public information 
activities at the Department of Defense level are 
not charged as public information activities in the 
Army, Navy, and ~ir Force. 
Mr. Ross: I cannot answer that; I am sorry. I do 
not have the answer to that. 
Major General Robert S. Moore, Assistant to the 
Comptroller, then offered: 
•••• the question arises in every single office from 
time to time as to what constitutes a proper charge 
against this limitation, and this is quite contro-
versial at times. 
The extent to which there is failure to comply with 
this congressional directive, in my opinion, is a 
question of interpretation of definitions. 
Mr. Ross: •••• We also have established procedures 
for administering the limitation including instruct-
ions which would make it incumbent on the services 
to charge against their limitation most of the 
activities to which you refer. 
Senator Chevez: But if they do not do it, if some 
officer puts a different interpretation on the 
directive, or the work that he is doing, the limi-
tation placed by Congress would have no effect 
whatsoever; is that correct? 
Mr. Ross: Yes 1 if he did not follow it. 
Senator Chevez: You are trying to cure that? 
Mr. ~: Yes. 
52 
Senator Chevez: If we get enought information before 
this bill is reported, we might be able to consider 
1t.47 
47 Senate Hearings, 1956, ~· cit ., pp. 438-439. 
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Although this exchange is actually a criticism of 
the administration of the Office of Public Information--
53 
which will be dealt with in another section--it is inserted 
here to point up another "limitation" issue, or weakness, 
which is a topic of opinion. 
The search for economy is next most evident in the 
questions on personnel requirements and utilization. In 
1953 Mr. Wigglesworth, during the House Hearings, asked 
about number, whether civilian or military, why an increase 
of seventeen people, and why they cost so much. 
Congressman Fo Edward Hebert, of Louisiana, speaking 
of the industry exhibited by public information personnel 
in the Pentagon, was more direct: 
I would slash ten percent civilian personnel right 
across that board, and you will find out that they 
can get along with that reduction if they have to.48 
In the Senate that year Mr. Berding painfully recapped 
the subject of personnel reduction to the Committee Members 
after a comment about overlapping in his office: 
We really have made an effort to cut down in the last 
2 years. Personnelwise we started that Central Office 
of Public Information 4 years ago with 285 people. 
That was cut down in successive years to 263 on June 
30, 1951, to 223 on June 30, 1952, and on June 30, 
1953, it was down to 146o If this new cut goes into 
effect, we will be down to 115 or 120 from the original 
285.49 
48 H House earings, 1954, Q2• cit., p. 723. 
49senate Hearings, 1954, Part II, Q2• cito 1 p. 1850o 
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The trend continued; In 1954 the personnel were 
reduced to approximately 100. In 1955, Senator Ellender 
asked: "How much money have you saved? •••• Oould you not 
use a pruning knife •••• Oan you not do it?"50 
Later in the year, in June of 1955, Senator Chevez, 
listening to a request for restoration of $100,000 cut in 
the appropriation, asked: 
How many personnel do you have in this particular 
program1 
Mr. ~: We have 65 civilians and 45 military. 
Senator Chevez: What is the main function of the 
service? What do you do? (Mentioned in Section I.) 
Mr. Ross: In the Office of Public Information there 
are grouped several functions in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. 
Senator Chevez~ If you have that many personnel, . 
there must be.ol 
54 
This lack of sympathy may have stemmed somewhat from 
another conversation, earlier, with Mr. J. A. Wylie, Budget 
Director, in which the Senator discovered that the original 
money requested for the Office ($500 1 000) did not actually 
cover all the expenses. 
It was revealed to him, through questioning, that 
the salaries of military personnel in the Office were not 
included, and that the estimated cost was an additional 
50senate Hearings, 1956, £2• cit., pp. 434-435. 
51senate Hearings, 1956, ~· cit., p. 1369. 
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55 
$300,000, charged to the military departments. The exchange 
ended with a rather terse, "Why did you not say that in your 
statement?"52 
In the hearings for the 1958 appropriations Represent-
ative John J. Riley, of South Carolina, displayed interest 
in the same area, saying to Mr. Loftis: 
Coming back to your personnel, Mr. Loftis, I wonder 
if we could have in the record the cost of the 48 
military people attached to this office. I would 
like to take a combination of the two (civilian and 
military) to see what the shop is costing.53 
The figures were interesting for more reasons than one, 
for they revealed that the single public information office 
at the seat of government cost more to operate than all of 
the offices of any one of the military departments. The 
actual expenditures at the end of fiscal 1957 were as 
follows: 
Dept. of Def. 
Army 
Navy 
Air Force 
$886,009 
740,491 
789,187 
728,626 
$3.144,313 
Of the $886,009, above, $336,927 was for military 
salaries, $454,682 for civilian salaries, and $94 1 400 for 
all other costs.54 
Congressman George W. Andrews, of South Carolina, 
52Ibid., p. 425. 
53House Hearings, 1958, Part II, £2• cit., p. 1828. 
54Department of Defense Analysis of Expenses for 
Public Information Activities Fiscal Years 1957, 1958 
and 1959; dated March 21, 1958, p. 2 
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56 
speaking to Mr. Allen, and Mr. Loftis, attempted to account 
for the difference between the actual expenditure distribu-
tion above and the stated limitation distribution mentioned 
below in the following exchange: 
Mr. Andrews: Section 620 places a limitation of 
f3";270,000 on the amount that can be spent for 
public affairs, public information offices, through-
out the services; is that right? 
Mr. Allen: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Andrews: What was the total amount you allocated 
to the three services? 
Mr. Loftis: It was $940 1 000 to each of the three 
services, which together with the $450,000 appropriated 
for the Office of Public Affairs, makes the limitation 
of $3,270, 000. 
Mr. Andrews: Do you know anything about any witness 
testifying before the Moss subcommittee of the Congress 
that you did not allocate $600,000 of the remaining 
$2,820,000? 
Mr. Loftis: I am not sure I quite understand that. 
You mean a witness testified we did not allocate 
$600,000. 
Mr. Andrews: I am informed that two witnesses testi-
field that $80 1 000 was not allocated to each of the 
services, which would make a total of $240,000, and 
then that each service refunded or kicked back $120,000. 55 
It is the money which Mr. Andrews refers to as a 
"kick-back~ which radically alters the picture each year, 
i.e., money charged to the military departments but used by 
the Office of Public Affairs--in 1957, $336,927. This 
accounting system, despite the fact tha t i t ~ eems to annoy 
55House Hearings, 1958, Part II, £2• cit ., p. 1824. 
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57 
some Congressmen, is still in effect and when projected 
through fiscal 1958 and 1959 looks like this: 
1958 Authorized Limitation 
Distribution 
Actual Distribution 
Dept. of Def. 
Army 
Navy 
Air Force 
1959 
Dept. of Def. 
Army 
Navy 
Air Force 
$550,000 
816,667 
816,667 
816,667 
$3,000,000 
Authorized Limitation 
Distribution 
$620,000 
850,000 
850,000 
850,000 
$3,170,000 
$865,000 
711,667 
711,667 
711,666 
$3,000,000 
Actual Distribution 
$912,500 
752,500 
752,500 
752,500 
$3,17o,ooo56 
As the figures show, the trend is toward increasing 
the amount of money for the Office of Public Affairs while 
the amount allowed to each service remains about the same. 
In addition to the money increase, the Secretary's 
Office was re-organized in 1957 to increase the scope of 
the Office of Public Affairs by separating it from Legisla-
tive Affairs. Congressman Scrivner had some questions on 
the effect of the re-organization on personnel: 
What did it provide as to personnel? 
Mr. Allen: It says nothing about personnel •••• 
Perhaps I should correct my previous statement. 
It did not involve additional personnel. It (the 
re-organization plan) states that except for legis-
lative affairs, all other functions, personnel and 
56nepartment of Defense Analysis,~· cit., pp. 3-4. 
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records, of the former Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Legislative and Public Affairs will be assigned to 
the Office of Public Affairs. 
Mr. Scrivner: Then why is there not a reduction in 
your personnel and your requests, or is this going to 
call for more personnel by the time it is divided up? 
58 
Mr. Loftis: This order was not necessarily designed to 
reduce personnel so much as to bring greater emphasis 
to the public affairs functions •••• 
Mr. Scrivner: There are some of us who think that 
there has been too much emphasis placed on this and 
that there is a waste of talent and money in this 
particular activity. I have felt that way for some 
time. There are other members of the committee who 
feel the same way.57 
While not all so condemnatory, there were many other 
congressional comments on a variety of subjects related to the 
economy of operation, e.g., unification of publications, 
amounts spent for security review, cost of letterheads, 
duplication, overlapping, waste of materials. 
The common desire of all the Congressmen, no matter 
what the subject, was to save money wherever possible--and 
wherever, in their opinion, the taxpayer might not think the 
money was being spent wisely. 
This remark of Congressman Sheppard is typical of the 
Representative's desire to constantly assume the role of his 
constituent in evaluating a program: 
The average person, if he could take the releasee per 
year volumewise would, in my opinion, look at the 
57House Hearings, 1958, Part II, Qe• cit., p. 1836. 
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appropriation of $~,500,000 (for 1955) and sa~, 
"What goes on in that sort of expendituree?M5 
59 
To sum up, there seems to be ever present a dichotomy 
of opinion among Congressmen in the matter of spending, both 
parts of which spike the guns of military public relations; 
(1) they generally attempt to keep all military expenditures 
as low as possible, and (2) their primary way of manifesting 
their disapproval of any activity is through fund limitation 
' 
or. denial. 
Perhaps one of the reasons for the poor opinion of 
public relations Bl Congress is poor public relatione with 
Congress, especially on money saving ideas. As expressed by 
Senator R. Young, of North Dakota: 
•.•• I have visited many of the fighting outposts through-
out the world, Korea and else where, and I have found 
that our military men are the moat cooperative and as 
nice to talk to as any people you can possibly find. 
But once they get over in the Pentagon, there is a 
tendency on the part of some of the lower echelon of 
all the military services to be pretty arrogant and 
develop a dislike for any suggestion that a Member of 
Congress might give to them on how they might economize. 
I hope that something can be done about that •••• 
Senator Ohevez during the same hearing, followed with: 
Along those lines •••• there are two things that I have 
heard complained about. As I said, the American people 
will not complain about money that is used for the Army, 
but I have heard lots of complaints about the public 
relations setup and •••• information approach, that not 
millions, but quite a little money could be saved •••• 59 
58House Hearings, 1956, .2l2.• cit., p. 642. 
59 Senate Hearings, 1956, £2• cit., p. 22 
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From all appearances, 11quite a little money" will be 
saved in military public relations, at least until the opera-
tion of the Office of Public Affairs earns sufficient publ~C 
and Congressional esteem to warrant expansion. 
IV. RELEASE OF INFORMATION 
One of the most lucrative sources of opinion is the 
general subject of release of information. As mentioned in 
Chapter I, there is a paradox, in that no two people agree, 
yet many are "experts"--on how much information should be 
released, to whom, when, what kind, in what manner, under 
what circumstances, how often and in what context. 
With the number of variables involved it is under-
standable that some issue and controversy would be evident. 
However, the stridency of the congressional voice on this 
subject implies more than mere personal disagreement or minor 
difference of individual opinion. There is an aggressive, 
negative consensus which permeates each discussion of the 
subject. 
Of the more than ninety comments-~and once again the 
overlapping of discussion areas is acknowledged--most were 
accusations of carelessness, or intentional deviation, e.g., 
withholding, misinforming, attempting to propagandize, etc. 
Some were milder. 
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For example, in discussing the Voice of America Mr. 
Barding stated in the 1954 Hearings that a staff member 
frequently came to the Pentagon to 11 pick up rna ter ial. 11 
Congressman Ostertag then remarked: 
Well, in a sense you are a propaganda agency? 
Mr. Barding: Well, I would very much like to get 
away from the Word 11 propaganda.M 
Mr. Ostertag: If the meaning of the word propaganda 
IS properly defined, I would say that in a sense you 
are giving out information which you like to give 
out, and only that which you like to give out, in 
the interest of our country.60 
While this was not a caustic remark, or apparently 
even meant to be critical, it reveals the attitude of Mr. 
Ostertag toward the information released at the seat of 
government • 
That same year in the Senate Mr. Berding was asked 
by Senator Ferguson what categories the press releases 
covered. He replied that: 
The press releases run quite a gamut but they are 
mostly of an operational nature. That is, they cover 
promotions, bids and the like. The press releases are 
closely tied in with some activity of the Department, 
something that is useful for the public to know. 
Senator Ferguson: Is it propaganda? 
Mr. Berding: It is not, sir, in my opinion. 
Senator Ferguson: Is it to try to sell legislation? 
Mr. Berding: No; it definitely is not .... 
60House Hearings, 1954, BE• ill· 1 p. 623. 
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Senator Ferguson: You realize there is a statute 
prohibiting that? 
Mr. Berding: That is right. 
Senator Ferguson: Do you think all officers are 
familiar with that?6l 
62 
Another exchange featured Congressman Hebert in which 
he complained about a Public Information Office attempt "to 
get a resolution adopted by (an) organization commending and 
complimenting General Marshall for being a great Secretary 
of Defense." Mr. Hebert contended that 11 it was not within 
the province (of the department head) to promote an accolade 
for his ruperior." He concluded with: 
The Public Information Office should be an office to 
give information •••• ! think the line should be drawn 
between propaganda and a real service. 
Congressman Moss echoed these same sentiments more 
than once during the Moss Committee Hearings. On July 12, 
1956 1 in a reply to Lt. General Floyd L. Parks, USA, one 
time Chief of Army Information, he stated: 
I agree all problems this committee deals with could 
be handled administratively, but we seem to be making 
progress backward at the moment. Congress may have 
placed ~ limitation Q£ information activities, but that 
!!! based on criticism that the information being put 
out was self-serving propaganda after an endless series 
of news releases had gone out which were more in the 
line of managed public relations than straight informa-
tion. That undoubtedly led to curtailment of budgets 
for public information officers. In fact, I think all 
of the departments of government became sensitive to 
61 . Senate Hearings, 1954, Part I., £2• cit., p. 660. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
6~ 
any charge that they had a public relations man aboard. 62 
(Italics not in the original.) 
Additional ammunition was provided congressional guns 
by the now rather famous "Constructive Contribution Clause" 
contained in a directive of Secretary Wilson. The order 
dealt with the clearance of Department of Defense information 
and stated in part that 
•••• review and clearance shall be related not only to 
a determination of whether release of the material 
would involve any technical or substantive violation 
of security but also to a determination of whether 
release or publication of the material would constitute 
a constructive contribution to the primary mission of 
the Department of Defense.63 
While the American press re-lit the "freedom of 
information" torch in editorial columns, articles, and his-
torical features, Members of Congress threw their tapers 
away and warmed themselves at the fire. 
In lees than a month Senator Chevez ae.ked: 
What Mr. Ross, is the fact about the report that Secretary 
Wilson will not let you give out a lot of this information?64 
Two months later, Mr. Ross had occasion to answer a 
question in part as follows: 
•••• we respond to many inquiries from the press, from 
Members of Congress and the general public, for informa-
tion concerning the activities of the Department of 
Defense. 
62House Hearings, Moss Committee, July 9, 101 and 12, 
1956, £2• cit., p. 1087. 
63Department of Defense Directive Number 52~0.9, 
dated March 29, 1955. Subject: Clearance of Department of 
Defense Information. 
64eenate Hearings, 1956, £E• cit., p. 424. 
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Senator Chevez: What about that edict in which the 
Secretary sal~ you were not to give out any informa-
tion! 
Mr. Ross: Mr. Chairman, the Secretary has said that 
we should see that the public is adequately and 
properly informed and we should certainly make every 
effort to gua,rd the security of our nation. 
Senator Chevez: That is right. There are no objec-
tions to that. I think it is a laudable effort in 
that respect. I hear complaints that in this public 
information program you are just saying how good you 
are. 
64 
Mr. Ross: I don't believe Mr. Chairman, that too 
much-or-our time is devoted to promoting the Department 
of Defense. 
Senator Chevez: You would be surprised within the 
Department how many people have complained to me that 
most of the time you are saying how good the Department 
is. I hope it is good.65 
Approximately fourteen pages of testimony and quest-
ioning were devoted to the "Constructive ContributionM in 
two days of the Moss Committee Hearings. The debate began 
with a general discussion of directives, then Mr. Moss asked: 
Well, ••• do you make certain that the release of material 
or publication of the material would constitute a con-
structive contribution to the primary mission of the 
Department of Defense? 
Mr. Snyder: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Moss: You do7 
Mr. Snyder: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Moss: Can you define for me what a constructive 
contribution to the primary mission of the Department 
of Defense is? 
65Ibid., p. 1370 
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•••• Constructive contribution is part of your directive 
hereo I am amazed that it was ever issued, and I am 
amazed that it continues to stand. It is in my judge-
ment an insult to intelligent people to say that you 
have to have a constructive contribution to any opera-
tion of government before you can talk about it. I am 
interested in how it applies. 
Mr. Robert Dechert, General Counsel, Department of 
Defense, then joined the conversation by raising the legal 
question of interpretation, saying further: 
It seems to me that there are vast areas where you and 
I would agree that was an appropriate thing. Let 1 s take 
this question: Suppose someone in the Department of 
Defense making a speech wanted seriously to criticize 
another department of government. Or suppose he wanted 
seriously to criticize a Congressman for some personal 
activity of hie. It would be a stupid thing, just as it 
would be in any other activity, to allow----
Mr. Moss: You are taking me far afield. 
Mr. Faecell: I surely wouldn 1 t agree with that. 
Mr. Dechert: Those are the fields where this statement 
requiring a constructive contribution is appropriate. 
Suppose he wants to criticize an ally of ours and he is 
in a prominent position----
Mr. Moss: Mr. Dechert, I am not going to swallow that 
one.--rt is in the directive of policy as an item of 
criteria. 
Mr. Dechert: I challenge that it has any usefulness at 
all. I think you could accomplish everything you are 
mentioning without putting in a policy directive the 
mandate that it shall make a constructive contribution. 
Its mere presence makes me extremely suspicious. It 
seems to me what you are saying is "Unless it makes 
us look good boys, don 1 t you say it, and don 1 t you 
clear it, Mr. Snyder, because we 1 ve got to look good 
to these people and this Congress. We can 1 t afford to 
look bad in the public eye at any time." 
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That is the way I interpret it. 
I agree with you that we could apply constructive 
contribution and come out with some very reasonable 
cases where it should be used. But as a matter of 
fixed criteria as it is here, I say that it is an 
improper inclusion in this instance. 
Mr. Dechert: •••• I know of no examples where it has 
been misused. If there are examples of misuse, then 
as we indicated before, I think we ought to quickly 
take into consideration the question of whether it 
ought to be changed. 
Mr. Moss: This committee is investigating information 
policies. We do have many examples which have led us 
to ask the questions we are asking •••• 
66 
This committee isn't operating and spending the money 
appropriated by this Congress just to go out on a jolly 
hunt. We have very specific complaints. 
If we feel in the citing of complaints we will get 
better response, we will do it, but it is not the 
burden of this committee at any time to illustrate 
any of its questions. We may or may not cite the 
examples. But your attitude, your interpretation, your 
application, Mr. Snyder, of this rule, is a thing of 
great moment not only to this committee but to the 
entire country •••• 
I think it is an unreasonable requirement. But I would 
like to have my fears dispelled. They haven't been.66 
The tenacity with which the Department of Defense held 
its position on the MConstructive Contributiond--under the 
hottest fire--is perhaps best demonstrated by the simple fact 
that the directive containing the clause was issued on March 
66united States Congress, House, Committee on 
Government Operations, Availability of Information From 
Federal Departments and Agencies, Part 9-Department of 
Defense, 4th Section, Hearings before Subcommittee, 85th 
Congress, let Session, April 10, 11, and 12, 1957 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 2253-
2255. 
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29, 1955, and the exchange above took place on April 11, 
1957. 
It is conceivable that Mr. Moss• fears may never have 
been dispelled. 
Another type of Congressional complaint was voiced 
by Congressman Jamie L. Whitten, of Mississippi, who 
volunteered 
•••• a possible explanation of why sometimes facts 
are giv·en to the press and to the public at 
a time when the Congress is called upon to keep 
them secret. 
•••• that is, that this budgeted program quite 
naturally being one that might create an issue 
between the Executive and the Congress as to 
whether the Congress approved the reductions and 
changes in this budget, (for 1956) such information 
could possibly have been given out in order to en-
list the public to support it and thereby affect 
the action of the Congress •••• 
I know from some years of experience on this 
committee that on various occasions the military 
services have seen that the public got this in-
formation in an effort to get public support for 
their side when in the Congress there were many 
others who differed with them, so if it gets to a 7 question of what I know, I personally know that. 6 
A month later, on February 11, 1955, Mr. Whitten 
speaking to Secretary of the Navy, Charles Thomas, literally 
continued the conversation with: 
In other words, the things released to the press and 
the things put in this record by the military, as I 
have heard them, are those things which would spur 
the American public sentiment up to appropriating $~0 
billion for the military. The other things which do 
not contribute in that direction are not mentioned. 
67 House Hearings, 1956, ~· cit., pp. 64-65. 
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That is true in the press. It is true--and I speak 
for myself only--in the presentations of you 
witnesses. It leads you to wonder if the prime 
decision has not been made and if the information 
given here is not all along that line. I use this 
only figuratively: Along the line of the Navy 
formerly seeing a submarine off the coast of Cali-
fornia every time the appropriation bill was up. I 
use that figuratively.6B 
68 
On one other facet of information release practice, 
Mr. Whitten, in 1958, said to Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Reuben B. Robertson: 
Mr. Secretary, let me interrupt you there. You are 
making a fine statement. The only thing is that I was 
not talking about why you do not give out •••• information 
as to the facts. You pointed out that you do not always 
know them and the estimates change. I was not even com-
plaining because you did not give out your best judgement. 
I was saying since you cannot, is it not time we stopped 
giving out misleading information, which is a different 
thing.69 
A variation of this theme was offered by Senator 
0 1Mahoney five years before. In that instance the Committee 
was not asked to keep the facts secret, nor was the informa-
tion misleading; Instead there was cross-information issued 
(i.e., information contrary to the statement released by the 
committee) which was not made available to the committee. 
The subject waa the well publicized "ammunition 
shortage in Korea." Senator 0 1Mahoney addressed Genera~ 
68united States Congress, House, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of the Navy Appropriations for 
1956, Hearings before Subcommittee, 84th Congress, 1st 
Session, February 11-March 24, 1955 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 108. 
69House Hearings, 1958, Part II, Q2. cit., p. 1401. 
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69 
J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff--who incidentally was 
at one time Army Chief of Information: 
Now may I ask you another question arising from publicity 
that appeared yesterday. In the course of your prepared 
statement which with your authority was released, you 
spoke about the drain of ammunition. You said in thie 
statement: 
He then read the ent.ire statement, which in part 
said: '0Some of the types of ammunition most important to 
our front-line soldiers have been rationed in Korea •••• " 
The Senator continued: 
The release of this statement from this committee 
which was published, of course, was approved by you. 
In the afternoon papers there was another story that 
information had been cabled back to Washington to the 
Pentagon from Tokyo--or radioed back, I do not know 
which--and a statement was made in Washington to the 
effect that the troops in Korea have not had to be 
rationed. I think it would be well if we-were-to-
have a complete clarification of that matter. 
(Italics not in the original.) 
The release or statement which was given out by the 
Pentagon after your testimony here was not made 
available to our committee.70 
Sometimes the releases or statements are not made 
available to anybody, according to some of the Members of 
Congress. Congressman Clare E. Hoffman, of Michigan, 
questioned Charles Coolidge, Chairman of the Committee on 
Classified Information on this subject in a Hearing before 
the Moss Committee, March 11, 1957, as follows: 
70 Senate Hearings, 1953, .212.• cit., pp. 388-389. 
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Mr • . Hoffman: Did you read the hearings before this 
committee when we had the first panel of newspapermen? 
Mr. Coolidge: Yes, I am not sure I read all of it, 
but I read part of it, certainly. 
Mr. Hoffman: You read enough to get the idea the 
Department was accused of just sitting on material 
they wanted. 
Mr. Coolidge: That is correct. 
Mr. Hoffman: There was no question about that was there? 
Mr • . Coolidge: No, and I got the same impression from 
talking to some of the individual reporters. 
Mr. Hoffman: Yes. Anyone who attempts to defend the 
departments on almost any phase of that doesn't get 
any place, does he, or don 1 t you know about that? 
Mr. Coolidge: I don 1 t know. 
Mr. Hoffman: Well, I can testify about that.7l 
The following month, April of 1957, Mr. Moss and Mr. 
Snyder discussed the release of news concerning nominations 
for top military jobs being withheld, in one case awaiting 
approval from allies, etc. Mr. Moss co~~ented: 
On the matter of appointment, I regard that as clearly 
a matter of Executive privilege. But I don't regard as 
a matter of Executive privilege the determination of 
how much information the public is going to receive or 
the Congress is going to receive.72 
71united States Congress, House, Committee on 
Government Operations, Availability of Information From 
Federal Departments and Agencies, Part 8-Department of 
Defense, 3d Section, Hearings before Subcommittee, 85th 
Congress, 1st Session, March 11, and 12, 1957 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 2023. 
72House Hearings, Moss Committee, April 10, 11, and 12, 
1957, £E• cit., p. 2241. 
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Senator Ferguson, speaking to Mr. Barding in 1953, 
brought up the probl em of simultaneously releasing material 
to all media. The 11 exclusive" or "leak" has been a major 
complaint area over the years. Said the Senator: 
•••• there are certain commentators--that is, certain 
people-- who apparently are able to get information: 
they get it in advance of its regular release. They 
get it where there are secret documents involved and 
so on. Do you think that is proper?73 
This topic is in turn related to the control of 
release material, which has already been covered. However, 
Congressman Miller observed that 
Nobody likes censorship either, but with matters as 
critical as Defense Department business is bound to 
be, I still do not quite get how your office functions 
with respect to the three other departments in the 
release of news. I will give you an example. You 
probably read the articles which have been in papere 
recently about supposed preference given certain 
magazines with reepect to news of the round-the-world 
flight of the B-52. It was charged that some newe 
magazine people got pictures that were not given to 
others. 
Does your part i cular office have anything to do with 
that?74 
Mr. Allen : It did not, in that particular instance. 
Later i n the same Heari ng, Mr. Miller inquired about 
another functio n , whi ch had been mentioned by other Congress-
men in other years: 
73senate Hearings, 1954, Part I ., ~· cit ., p. 662. 
74senate Hearings, 1958, Part II, QE• cit., p. 1847. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
72 
Do you have any function of trying to keep the record 
straight? In other words, if some unauthorized state-
ment goes out or appears to have the color of authenticity 
but is erroneous and does not tell the story, do you put 
out releases to counteract the erroneous impression that 
may be given to the public?75 
Congressman Ford, four years before, had made a 
specific complaint which also touched on retraction, veri-
fication of authenticity and objectivity. His lament: 
I have before me here this press release which came 
from the Department of Defense, Office of Public 
Information, dated August 26, 1952, which is entitled: 
"The Navy Department's Statement on the Effects of the 
So-Called Davis Rider on Officer Promotions in the 
Navy." 
As you may recall, the Davis rider was approved on the 
1953 military appropriation bill. It related to the 
promotions within the various branches of the service. 
This press release says in part, and I am quoting: 
However the arbitrary provisions of the rider operate. 
to limit the total number of the commissioned officers 
in a grade without consideration for the Reserve 
officers on active duty • 
•••• Would you not say, from that one sentence which I 
read there, that was pretty strong language for the 
Department to put out without making a thorough inves-
tigation to the facts in the case? A ~ittle investiga-
tion of the facts would have clearly demonstrated that 
the Department of the Navy was completely negligent in 
its failure to provide the Congress with accurate 
information • 
•••• It would seem to me in this kind of a situation 
there was a l ack of authenticity and objectivity. 
Furthermore, it is a case of the inaccurate informa-
tion getting the publicity. And furthermore, in this 
case no attempt was made so far as I know to clear 
75Ibid., p. 1848. 
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the record. Ev·en if the record had been cleared it 
would not have received the widespread publicity and 
unfavorable results which the original release had.76 
73 
On the surface, it would seem that such incidents with 
the three military departments and with the Defense Department 
Office of Information have each year intensified the desire 
in Congress for some foolproof system of control of re-
leases. This query from Congressman Andrews was not new 
when voiced in 1957: 
Just who in the Department of Defense decides what 
will and what will not be released as public 
information??? 
Because of the complexity of the operation, the size 
of the organization, and the dynamic character of world 
events, politics, and budgets, it is doubtful that any 
simple, concise answer will ever be forthcoming. The answer 
which Mr. Allen was able to offer was not a "who, '1 but 
rather what offices were contained in the normal channel. 
As always, bigness defied any constant personalized treatment. 
Another sub-area under this section, frequently 
mentioned by Congressmen, was the question of exactly what 
type of information is released. Among those seeking clari-
fication was Senator Chevez, who in 1955, asked of Mr. Rosa: 
All right, Mr. Ross, you tell the committee the type 
of information that you furnished the public in 1955. 
76House Hearings, 19541 £E• cit., pp. 620-621. 
77House Hearings, 1958, Part II, ~· cit., p. 1823. 
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What information is available and what class of 
information is not. Who gets it. 78 
74 
Once again, the answer is not simply stated, nor 
was Mr. Ross' complete. The best answer found by the in-
vestigator was contained in a Moss Committee document which 
lists twelve kinds of information not available to the public. 
It also reviews the categories within which access might be 
limited. Assuming that all other types of information~ 
available, it is then possible to achieve delineation, or 
separation of the whole into manageable parts. 79 
In the House Hearings of 1958, Congressman George 
H. Mahon, of Texas began a discussion of what military 
information is available, with Secretary Quarles of the Air 
Force, during which, the Symington Committee Report of 
January 25, 1957 was examined: 
Mr. Mahon: The last point, No. 23, deals with informa-
tion available to the American people, regarding our 
relative mi l itary strength. This point ends with thie 
statement: 
The public has failed to receive from official 
sources complete, accurate, and timely information 
which it has the right to know. 
Congressman Daniel J. Flood, of Pennsylvania, sub-
sequently took the floor saying: 
78senate Hearings, 19561 Qe• cit., p. 426 
79United States Congress, House, Committee on 
Government Operations, Replies From Federal Agencies to 
~uestionnaire Submitted ~ the Special Subcommittee £a 
overnment Information, 84th Congress, lst Session, 
November 1, 1955 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1955), pp. 117-118. 
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With regard to your last question, No. 23, this is a 
serious proposition. Look at the next to the last 
sentence on page 97 of question 23: 
Nevertheless, the public is neither adequately 
nor accurately informed about our military 
strength as against the great and growing 
wealth of communism. 
75 
Still speaking to Secretary Quarles he later stated: 
The chairman read you this: 
The public is still to receive from official 
sources complete, accurate, and timely--
and I repeat ~timely"--
information which it has the right to know. 
Now, I want to see the public get the information, 
but I wonder if even this committee receives timely 
information on that. (Referring to changes in in-
telligence estimates of Russian strength.) 
Now, sometime or the other about that period of time, 
since this budget, your intelligence found itself to 
be at least 50 percent in error, vis-a-vis Russian 
figures. Now, as far as I have been able to find out 
neither the Congress nor the public nor anyone else 
knew of that. There was no public disclosure from our 
intelligence, but apparently you knew aa far back as 
last summer, or 6 or 7 months ago, that you were 50 
percent wrong on the Russian heavy bomber estimate. 
Yet nobody told anybody the figures that the American 
public thought were eo, the figures that the Congress 
thought were so, and the figures that this subcommitte 
thought were so, even during our debates while we were 
voting on it, and you knew, or somebody knew, that we 
were 50 percent wrong.80 
80united States Congress, House, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 
1958, Hearings before Subcommittee, 85th Congress, 1st 
Session, Part I, January 30-March 7, 1957 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 1060-1063. 
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Because this is a study of an information releasing 
agency it is impossible to divorce entirely any of the 
congressional comments under other sections from this topic 
of release. However, the quotes employed in the last few 
pages are intended to pinpoint, in eo far as possible, what 
Congress thinks of information released. 
The general opinion appears to be poor, based on 
the Moss Committee reports, the Symington Committee Report, 
and comments made during congressional hearings. There are 
other reports, such as the one from which this excerpt is taken--
and which seems to telescope and summarize the findings: 
It appears that there has been too much information, 
misinformation, cross-information~ and non-information 
emanating frdm the Department •••• ~l 
The irony is that it was written in 1953. 
V. SECURITY 
The term "security" as used here refers to the problems 
of: (1) maximum disclosure vs. security of information vital 
to the national defense effort--the dilemma briefly dealt 
with previously, (pp. 8-10), (2) classification and de-
classification, and (3) the inconsistent, unauthorized, or 
withholding of, release of information of a controversial 
nature, i.e., information about which there is disagreement 
as to whether it should be classified or not. 
81House Report No. 680, June 2?, 1953, ££• cit. 
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77 
All three are closely related to each other, and to 
Section IV, RELEASE OF INFORMATION. However when the basic 
purpose or reason for a Congressman's comment on release of 
information appeared to be his concern over national security--
or lack of it--then the quote was relegated to this section. 
It is not surprising that the number and heterogen-
eity of Congressmen precluded exact agreement on very many 
subjects. 
In this case the opinion continuum is heavily weighted 
at each end, with fallow middle ground, There is either too 
much released which is detrimental to the security of the 
United States, or so little that the public is denied know-
ledge of how its government is functioning. Some examples 
of these views: 
Unfortunately, there has existed and still does exist 
in high governmental and military circles a strange 
psychosis that the government's business is not the 
people's business. For reasons less clear, high govern-
ment officials persist in giving lip service to the 
fact that the people have a right to know but in actual 
practice they circumvent this right to the people. Gov-
ernment officials have a growing tendency to forget that 
in a democracy it is up to the people to make final 
decisions and that is impossible unless the necessary 
information is available on which to base such decisions. 
This psychosis persists to the point where some govern-
ment officials decide what is good for the people to 
know. 
The Defense Department and its component branches are 
classifying documents at such a rate that the Pentagon 
may some day become no more than a huge storage bin pro-
tected by triple-combination safes and a few security 
guards. Millions of documents each year are being added 
to the Defense Department's classified files, and only a 
fraction are being declassified annually. 
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Unless some operative system of declassification is 
developed in the near future, we may find ourselvee 
completely walled off from our past historical 
achievements as well as from future progress in basic 
science.82 
This statement represents the opinion of an entire 
78 
committee and is based on the results of more than a year's 
investigation of the availability of information from federal 
agencies. 
On the other hand, another report from another com-
mittee, also made up of Congressmen and representing their 
collective opinion, diametrically opposes the Moss Committee 
with this brief but unequivocal assertion: 
Too much information has be.en released which is of no 
benefit to the American ~ublic but which is of tremendous 
value to our opponents.s 
Conceivably, both groupe could be right if judged by 
the specific incidents which comprise their separate frames 
of reference. Certainly both cannot be right when the entire 
problem is considered. 
What is unfortunate for the man in the middle, the 
military public relations officer, is that even from their 
disjunctive poles both camps are united in their positve 
belief that the present classificat ion system must be 
82Moss Committee 25th Intermediate Report of July 
27, 1956, £2• cit., p. 89. 
83united States Congress, House, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 
1956, 84th Congress, 1st Session, House Report Noo 493, 
May 5 1 1955 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955). 
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drastically altered. Suffice to say that it would be 
impossible to find a solution that is not inversely pro-
portional, i.e., the more pleased one group becomes, the 
more displeased becomes the other. 
79 
One of the most concerned in the group which be-
lieves that we are consistently giving out~o much valuable 
data is Congressman Mahon. On March Jl, 1954, he revealed 
mixed feelings of some progress vis-vis terrible mistakes. 
To Secretary Wilson: 
I personally would not h es i tate very long to give you 
a chance to try to modify our public information pro-
gram, with the hope of improving it. 
•••• I think that some progress is being made in this 
field of public relations. We belabor the subject 
almost daily, in the committee, of tighter restrictions 
on information that is given out. Most of the morning 
has been taken up in discussion of that matter here, 
and I think it would be difficult to exaggerate the 
importance of stricter controls on information that is 
helpful, or might be helpful to the enemy. 
I think the damage that has been do ne to this country 
by the spies and subversi ves is just a tiny drop in 
the bucket compared to the damage that has been done 
by release of public information as to national defense 
procedures and programs, and developments, through the 
Department of Defense, through the Congress and through 
industry, and through trade journals, and so forth. 
I think we have given the enemy the equivalent of 
billions of dollars worth of information •••• 
I do not know whether you feel as strongly as I do about 
this matter or not, but you probably do not . 
Secretary Wilson: Well, we feel quite strongly about it, 
I can assure you of that, and I am very hopeful that we 
can make some real progress in it. 
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If we seem to be clamping down pretty tight, and if we 
get a howl and some criticism from the people whose job 
it is to try to promote this stuff all the time, bear 
with us a little bit, and support us in it.84 
Whether because of the kind of action taken or the 
manner in which it was carried out and presented to the public, 
it is generally agreed that Mr. Wilson's ensuing public rela-
tions program, both for himself and the Department of Defense, 
got more 10howle 10 than 10 support. te85 
Some of the results: 
Mr. Moss: I recall where one member of the Appropriations 
Committee wrote and asked for the pictures of some of the 
interiors of non-combatant military planes used to carry 
personnel. 
Some of them were rather delux pieces of flying equipment. 
He received the photograph, stamped ~secret." 
Now remember, under Executive Order 10501, the security 
of the United States was directly and gravely involved 
in that plane's interior. You know Mr. Snyder, just as 
I do, that that couldn't affect the security of anyone 
except perhaps the peace of mind of a few people at the 
Pentagon. It might have outraged some of the taxpayers. 
But it certainly would not have disturbed in any way, 
even remotely, the security of this nation unless per-
haps a disturbed Admiral or General might not be able to 
do as efficient work, fearing public criticism. 
It is this type of thing which makes me feel we cannot 
depend entirely upon the Executive. We have got to 
share this responsibility; we have to protect the 
interests of the Congress, which is immediately 
84House Hearings, 1955, ~· cit., pp. 558-559. 
85The responsibility for criticisms contained in 
prior and subsequent Sections of this study leveled between 
February 1953 and October of 1957 must rest on the shoulders 
of Secretary Wilson. 
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representative of the people. We also have to protect 
the public interest because sometimes we ha~e public 
officials who don't perform as they should. We have to 
have all the avenues opeV to learn all the faats-neoessary 
to pr"'OVe that they haven tperformed as they should.86 
(Italics not in the original.) 
The Executive Order to which Mr. Moss referred, was 
.promulgated on November 6, 1953, and (1) deprived twenty-
eight Federal agencies of the power to classify information 
on grounds of national security, (2) restricted classifica-
tion power to seventeen agencies, (3) re-defined security class-
ifications--dropping the RESTRICTED cate_gory, and (4) es-
tablished new machinery for appeal and review. 
The '1dilemma" gained new status through Presidential 
recognition when Mr. Eisenhower wrote: 
Throughout the lengthy consideration of this order it 
has been the purpose to attain in it the proper balance 
between the need to protect information important to 
the defense of the United States and the need for 
citizens of this democracy to know what their government 
is doing. 
The protests of the citizens who did not feel that 
they knew what the government was doing continued. Following 
the "constructive contribution~ directive in March of 1955, 
complaints doubled and re-doubled. The American Society of 
Newspaper Editors lodged a formal dissent. The managing 
editors of the Associated Press in a . resolution adopted in 
November 1955, stated: 
86House Hearings, Moss Committee, April 10, 11, and 12, 
1957, .2.P.• cit., p. 2242. 
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The Association expressly condemns the withholding of 
information that has not been classified and that is 
not eligible for classifying on the pretext that it is 
not 'constructive' or on the excuse that even though 
it is nonsecurity information it might be of 'possible 
use 1 to a potential enemy. 
The effec~ on Congress of such well publicized out-
82 
cries is a matter of conjecture, however, when coupled with 
the predispositions of the two camps mentioned earlier it is 
not surprising that 10 new Congressmen 11 rather than countries 
were heard from during the year. Senator Stuart Symington, 
of Missouri, warned: 
No careful reader of our press can doubt that this 
country is menaced by a deliberate policy on the part 
of our government to witlL~old information from the 
American people.87 
Another Democrat, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, of 
Minnesota, was morelyric but no less alarmed when he read 
into the Congressional Record. 
This shroud of silence which has descended over the 
government prevents not only the American people 
from knowing what it is doing, but prevents the gov~rnment itself from functioni ng as i t should.88 
Other Congressmen , on the other hand, have continually 
voiced concern over the amount of informat ion presented in 
testimony as secre t wh i ch finds its way to t he public press. 
Congressman Charl es B. Deane, of Nor th Caroli na, speaking to 
87From a speech made in New York Ci ty , July 7 1 1955. 
88congressional Record 0 Volume 101, No. 133, Daily 
Edition, August 3, 1955 (Washington ~ Government Printing 
Office), pp. 11319- 11329. This i s only a n exc erp t from a 
rather lengthy discussion of the sub j ec t. 
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Secretary Wilson in 1955, said: 
I want to follow up •••• on how news releases appear in 
the press and in magazines on what might usually be 
referred to in the committee as extremely secret. 
Mr. Deane then mentioned an article in the u. S. 
News and World Report of January 28, 1955, which contained 
most specific information on the number and composition of 
units of the U. S. Army and where they were to be located, 
saying: 
I wonder whether or not we are being asked, as 
members of the commi ttee, to suppress certain 
testimony when the press actually seems to know more 
about it than members of the committee.89 
8~ 
Repre sentative Scrivner has pursued the proposition 
for many years. In 1953, he proposed to Mr. Berding: 
Let us take the story on the atomic submarine. Let 
us take the story on Nike. Let ' us take the story 
on a lot of these missiles and other things. Do 
they clear through your off i ce? 
Mr. Berding ~ If they are formal press releases they do. 
With regard to some of those, there may be material 
written by a representative of a newspaper or a 
magazine. You referred to the atomic-submarine story. 
A good many of thos e stori es were in magazines. They 
were not formal press releases. 
A magazine correspondent came in and he talked to 
different pe opl e . He got a bit here and a bit there, 
and after a while he got himself quite an article. 
Mr. Scrivner~ That is exactly the thing that ia dis-
turbing us; the fact that they can go around and pick 
up a bit of information here and a bit of information 
89 ' 
House Hearings , 1956, 22• cit., p. 63. 
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there, and while maybe the one story may not be 
complete and accu:rate, perhaps the item under dis-
cussion will not be named, but a week later some 
other news story breaks and while it may not 
incorporate all the information in the previous 
story, here comes the name of the item, a name we 
were told we could not even put down on our note 
pad in this room. 
Mr. Berding: It is a problem, Mr. Scrivner. I 
recognize that. It sometimes assume s serious 
proportions.90 
Congressman Wigglesworth merely took note of the 
''problem'' in 1953, ment i oning Mr. Scrivner's statement 
during a discussion of the Of fice of Securi ty Review.9l 
But in the Hearings dur i ng March of 1954 he elaborated: 
I raise this question, Mr. Secretary, because this 
committee has been greatly disturbed in the past on 
various occasions by the fact that something has been 
presented here across the table as being secret or 
classified, and then within the next two or three 
days the whole thi ng, or a large part of it, has 
appeared publicly in the }:ages of some newspaper or 
other publication, indicating a complete lack of 
proper control somewhere along the line.92 
In 1957 he reiterated: 
84 
As I think you know, this committee has been very hard 
put to understand how time and again we are told here 
in secrecy about this or that development or this or 
that new model , or whatnot, and then within a few days 
or a week or so we see practically what we have been 
told in secret in some magazine or some newspaper or 
some photo graph that has been put out.93 
90House Hearings, 1954, £2• cit., p. 607. 
91Ibid., p. 613. 
92House Hear ings, 1955, .21!• cit ., p. 5·49 . 
93House Hearings, 1958, Part II, ~· cit., p. 1830. 
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In the same Hearing Mr. Scrivner diverged slightly 
in an exchange with Mr. Allen : 
That brings up another question of a small point. 
Hardly a .day goes by but we pick up a paper and see 
where some general, 1-,2-,3-, or 4-star, has gone 
someplace to make a speech. First you wonder how he 
can find that much time to go, let alone prepare it. 
In that speech there will be things said, apparently 
now with your approval, that to this committee do not 
seem proper because perhaps just that day or within 
85 
the week perhaps the very things this man is discussing 
publicly have been presented to us as a secret matter •••• 
You put a secret label on it because you are afraid we 
will talk--however, this committee never has •••• Somebody, 
a general or admiral or somebody, goes out and makes a 
speech •••• yet as far as we are concerned the information 
is still secret and we cannot say anything about it •••• 
I could show you examples at least once a week of that 
if not more. It is a little bit irksome. 
Mr • . Allen: I should think it would be. 94 
Congressman Riley also quizzed Mr. Allen, without re-
vealing exactly what he had in mind. However, it can be 
assumed that he was worried about speech content, in that he 
used the word ~censorship~ i n his initial query: 
What about the speeches that the military people make; 
are they refer red to you for your censorship? 
Mr. Allen : Only those originating at the seat of 
government here in Washington. I do not review the 
speeches t ha t people i n California present for example. 
Mr. Riley: The ones that originate in the Pentagon? 
Mr. Allen: Yes, sir. 
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Mr. Riley: Who reviews the speeches of those officers 
who are in the field? 
Mr. Allen: I do not know •••• 
In the same discussion, which shifted to the area of 
standardization of information releases, Mr. Riley commented: 
I was wondering how you achieved any standardization of 
the information that you release. 
Mr. Allen: It is rather difficult, except that we try 
to withhold only such information as is necessary to 
withhold for security reasons. Otherwise, we permit 
free discussion. 
Mr. Riley: Some feel that certain items are of security 
nature and others might not. There is a wide difference 
of opinion there. 
Mr. Allen: That is right . This is in the judgement 
area •••• It is very dif~icult to have ariy real standard, 
with no formula. 
Mr. Riley: There is no regular formula? 
Mr. Allen: No; and no IBM machine to ~ork it out. 95 
While Mr. Riley and Mr. Scrivner worried about lack of 
censorship in the utterances of the upper military echelons, 
Congressman Flood, was upset by the controls imposed upon 
them by the Office of Public Affairs: 
Do I understand t hat out of an abundance of caution your 
advisory council or your office (speaking to Mr. Swan), 
actually demands the appearance before your council of 
military witnesses with maps and statements to be sub-
mitted, and other i nf ormation, before they are allowed 
to come up here? Do you include in your jurisdiction an 
interrogation or the placing of an imprimatur on the 
testimony of military men before they come t o an 
executive session of this subcommittee? 
95 . Ibid., p. 1827. 
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This is an executive session and you all know that no 
statements are issued out of this committee. 
Do I understa nd that General X must bring you a state-
ment and if he is going to use maps or charts he mus t 
bring it to you before he comes to this subcommittee. 
87 
Mr. Swan: •••• It asks that the services submit prepared 
statements to the Securi ty Revi ew Branch , of our office 
where anything that would be inimical to the security of 
our country is deleted •••• 
Mr. Flood: I had the impression~-! gather I am wrong; 
and I certainly hope I am-~that under Mr. Seaton 1 s 
order not only do you become an accessory after the 
fact but before the fact, and your office wants to 
find out, 10What are you going to say up there? Do not 
say that 0 that is a security matter.~ I want to know 
what glorified clerk is going to tell what general that 
he cannot tell me wha t .96 
On a gentler note Senator Ferguson quietly asked Mr. 
Berding: 
Now, do you know whether or not any of your civilians 
or any of your military officers on public information 
are releasing any secret information? 
Mr. Berdi ng answered that he had no information of 
anyone doing s o 6 and certainly not from his office, to which 
Senator Ferguson replied, ~You do recognize that that should 
not exis t . t!9 7 This perhaps should be labeled the understate-
ment of the year 1953, in view of the enormity of the problem 
and its prominence in Mr. Berding 8 s work. 
96House Hearings, 19561 Qe• cit., pp. 668=669. 
97senate Hearings, 19541 Par t I . , £2• cit ., p. 661 
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Classification, or absence of it, Will be treated 
here only to clarify in the reader's mind what part the 
Office of Public Affairs plays, and what the two main 
abuses are in the mind of Congress. Congressman Andrews 
asked the question: 
We hear a lot of di ssatisfaction about classification. 
What does your office do in an effort to coordinate 
the classification of documents and papers between 
the services? 
Mr. Allen: Actually we do not have much to do with 
the classification and declassification of particular 
documents as such •••• The services apply the classifica-
tion and declassification procedures which are spelled 
out in their regulations as to the handling of these 
papers.98 
This essentially answers the queationo The Office of 
Public Affairs does, in fact, very little classifying or · 
declassifying, its main interest in the matter being to screen 
material proposed for publication and safeguard mill tary 
security. Relativel y speaking this is a very small part of 
the classification picture. However, probably because the 
Office has a Security Review Branch, it is often criticized 
for policies not actually under its control or within its 
jurisdiction. 
The abuses of the present classification system as 
brought out in the Moss Committee Hearings are quickly 
described by two questions of the Chairman and the answers 
of Mr. Trevor Gardner, Former Assistant Secretary of the Air 
Force: 
98House Hearings, 1958, Part II, Q2• cit., p. 1825. 
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Well, we are studying the problem that is a problem of 
the American peopl e and of their Governmen t a nd I think 
Congress has to recognize a certain responsibility in 
so~t of edging people over to the overly cauti ous aide 
in the classifying of information. Some committees 
from time to time have jumped on personnel, or Federal 
departments or agencies, and have been very critical 
of them. Do you feel that that, together with the 
fact that you can be severely criticized for under-
classifying, or falling to classify, but rarely ever 
criticized for overclaasifylng, might increase the 
tendency of an lnvidual to overclassify? 
Mr. Gardnerg There is no question about it •••• 
Additionally, the classification may be abused so that 
a document may be classified Top Secret when actually 
it should be unclassified, perhaps to protect the 
ind1v1dual 1 a position in the matter. I can recall 
having rece ived an instruction to cancel an important 
program and the instruction itself was classified Top 
Secret •••• The reason for putting Top Secret on it was 
that the office issuing the instruction to cancel did 
not wish t o be i dentified with it •••• 
Mr. Moss: Is it possible that some of the classification 
that-ra-belng used is being used to save departments, 
agencies, a nd individuals from possible embarrassment? 
Mr. Gardner : Yea, I am sure tha t occurs quite frequently.99 
Mr. Gardner painted a gl oomy p icture during hie 
testimony--unfortunately , there is every reason to believe 
that he did not exagger ate the situat ion. Two other statements 
which he made illustrate the inherent impracticability of the 
system: 
Within the Military Establishme nt , I am sure there are at 
least one million pe ople who can originate classification 
of docume nts . 
99Moas Committee 25th Intermediate Report of July 27 , 
1956, QE• cit., pp . ~9-40. 
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One of the things that I know you are concerned about 
(to Mr. Moss) is how do they ever get unclassified 
and I would say that only hundreds of thousands of 
documents ge t unclassified, as opposed to the millions 
that get classified.l00 
90 
In all fairness, it should be noted that all breaches 
of security cannot be laid a t the door of the Defense Depart-
ment. In 1954 Congressman Mahon told Secretary Wilson~ 
You can close everyoneu s mouth at the Pentagon, but 
if these trade journala continue to give intimate 
details in regard to our defense gadgets, your program 
is not goi ng to be worth much • 
•••• The trade magazines carry all of the information 
about our latest devel opments, scientific achievements, 
and our guided miasileso 
Secretary Wila on g We will make it a little more 
expensive for them to do it , I assure you of that. 
Mr. Mahon g If you would cancel a few hundred million 
dollars i n c ontracts , some of these days you might 
wake them up to wha t they are doi ng to ua. 
Secretary Wils an g Le t us see how we get along with 
this next year. 
Mr. Mahon g I am perfectly willing to go along and 
see how you ge t along, but I wish, aomehow 0 we c ould do 
something about this . 
The last time tha t Secretary Forreatal waa in this room, 
he was summoned here because a release had been made by 
the Pentagon about bacteriological warfare. 
We asked Secretary Forreatal and the Secretari es of the 
Army, Navy 0 a nd Air Force to come down here and confer 
with us about this pr oblem, and the Secret ary assured us 
that he was going to work out a much i mprov ed system for 
public information . 
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91 
I am sure he tried, but nothing much came of it, and I 
hope more will come of this.lOl 
Now Mr. Wilson has also come and gone, but Congress is 
not yet appeased. In the 1958 Hearings many of the same House 
Members were still bitterly complaining about the same things, 
including Mr. Mahon who had such high hopes: 
We have been discussing here in the committee whether or 
not we are receiving reports that are too alarming or 
whether or not they are sufficiently alarming. 
I doubt if there is any other country in the world that 
makes it so easy for espionage agents to gather informa-
tion. I believe that the only real problem of the 
espionage agent is the one that I myself have--that is, 
in finding time to evaluate and reach the proper con-
clusions from the mass of conflicting information that 
we get •••• 102 
While some protest the lack of security the dilemma 
thrives, for other Members of Congress in April of 1958, were 
busily engaged in bringing a bill before the House to prevent 
concealment from the public by Federal agencies of documents 
and information considered essential to proper conduct of 
government and an informed public opinion. 
To sum up, it would seem that the only security about 
which Congress is in complete accord is "social", and that 
on the subject there is consensus only in their opinion of 
military public information, which was briefly expressed in 
a Committee Report, to wit: 
101House Hearings, 1955, £2· cit., pp. 559-560. 
l02House Hearings, 1958, Part I, op. cit., PP• 1060-1061. 
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The study of the Defense Department so far shows that 
the informational policies and practices of the Depart-
ment are the moat restrictive--and at the same time the 
most confused--of any major branch of the Federal 
Gover nment.l03 
VI. CONDUCT OF 
MILITARY PUBLIC RELATIONS 
In addi ti on to the opinion regions already covered 
there has been considerable congressional interest in the 
administration of the Office of Public Affairs, i.e., how the 
business of military public relations is conducted at the 
seat of government . 
As the reader by now might expec t , the legislators 
have, over the years, found a number of items about which to 
wax eloquent. Foremost among thes e is the matter of service 
headline rivalry which, according to Congress, continues un-
checked despite repeated demands for corrective action. 
In 1949 the issue wee prominent enough to warrant 
treatment in a press re l ease issued by Congressman Carl 
Vinson, Chairman , Committee on Armed Services, which read 
in part: 
The Armed Services Committee wants it clearly under-
stood that if persons in the armed services or in 
their employ continue to pass statements to the press 
which are calculated to depreciat e the activities of 
a sister service and which, at the same time, jeopard-
ize the national security, the Committee will step in 
103 Moss Committee 25th Intermediate Report of July 
27, 1956, QE• cit., p. 88 
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with a full=acale investigation. We Will not tolerate 
the continuance of this pPactice.l04 
Congressman Ostertag, in May of 1953, asked Mr. 
Berding: 
Do you feel that the establishment of the Office of 
Public Information has in any sense overcome the 
great competition which has prevailed between the 
several branches of the military over the years? 
Mr. Berding: I am quite convinced that it has, sir. 
ram most emphatic on that point .l05 
During that same year Congressman Scrivner was par-
ticularly vocal , mentioning the problem on more than one 
9;3 
occasion. Speaking to Dr. Walt er Whitman , Chairman, Research 
and Development Board he complained~ 
I, too, have been somewhat irked about this rivalry for 
headlines •••• between the services; which can do nothing 
more than create a great deal of lack of confidence of 
the publ ic , and a great deal of wonderment as to whether 
they are fighting under t he same flag or not, •••• for the 
public to read these stories , they might well wonder 
whether the Navy is an ally of the Air Force or whether 
the Air For ce is an ally of the Navy or whether either 
one of them is an ally of our Army. 
We discussed this other day with Secretary Wilson and 
if you can help him to atop that I hope you will.l06 
In 1954 1 it appeared that Mr. Berding should not have 
been so ''emphatic, Ill for the situation remained unchanged--
at least to Mr. Scrivner and some others , including the 
104Reproduced and referred to in t he Moss Committee 
Hearings, July 9, 10, and 12, 1956, .21! • cit ., p. 931. 
105House Hearings, 1954, £2• cit ., p. 625. 
106Ib id oo Po 157. 
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President of the United States . In a four~way discussion 
with Mr. Scrivner , Secretary Wilson, and Assistant Secretary 
Seat .on 1 Mr. Wigglesworth opened with : 
I do not think the committee wants to close doors to 
proper information, but I think the anxie ty heretofore 
has been rather in the opposite direc tion; that in the 
eagerness to make available some news tha t was a scoop 
or a headline story that proper care has not been 
exercised. 
Mr. S.eaton: We are aware of that. 
Mr. Scrivner~ Plus another fact, that there seemed to 
be a race on between services for the headlines. If 
one service comes out wi th one story, immediately 
another one has to break into a headline to compete, 
and then a third one , until finally you have a whole 
cycle, much of which would have been better had it not 
gone out. 
What will your new setup do to atop this race for 
headlines? 
Secretary Wilson : •••• I have bee n studying this thing 
now, on and off, for a year. If you ge t into the thing 
too late there is not much you can do about it. So this 
is an effort to get into it at the right time. 
I will say this: If this organization does not make an 
improvement over what has been done Mr. Seaton and I 
are both going to be in trouble. Not only are you 
gentlemen irritated by itO but the President certainly 
has been concerned, too.l 7 
So waa Congressman Miller, who the next year registered 
a mild rebuke, saying to Mr. Swan : 
It occurs to me-~and I think this committee has expressed 
itself on thisroore in the pas t-- that while wholesome 
rivalry and a certain amount of pr ide of service is a 
splendid thing there have been ins tances where the 
107Houae Hearings, 1955, 22• cit ., p. 550. 
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96 
•••• We have been di~cussing off the record some of the 
situations that have developed which seem to demonstrate 
a great dea l of rivalry between the services for 
headlines. 
What authority does your office have and what is your 
office doing to minimize this ever=growing race to get 
the headlines in the news by the service.llO 
Probably the answer lies not with the Office of Public 
Affairs bu t in the basic structure of the Defense organization 
with its present loose policy control of three separately 
administered services. 
Other comments about the administration of the Office 
of Public Affairs through the years have been varied and 
seldom concentrated. The second and third most popular 
topics being congressional liaison, a nd whether the activi-
ties of the office have expanded beyond what Congress in-
tended in setting the limitation in 1951. 
In talking about the number of military public 
information offices Senator Fergus on exhibits a rather ob-
vious distrust of the integrity of the services in obeying 
the regulations imposed by the limita tion . He mentioned 
duplication and added: 
•••• Then I want to know whether or not there are many 
more ( offices) that are covered up under other names 
and unde r other jobs that are used on public relations 
part time or whole t i me.lll 
Congressman Ford also has shown some l ack of trust 
and on one occasion stated: 
110House Hearings» 1958, Part II, 2£• cit., p. 1834. 
111 Senate Hearings, 1954, Part I, .212.• cit ., p. 659. 
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I know why the limitation was imposed, but I am1 wondering whether there is strict compliance.l 2 
Congressman Wigglesworth became concerned in a dis-
cussion with Mr. Schooley about the scope of the Office of 
Public Information, saying: 
If I understand the picture, just as one member of 
this committee-, I think this subdivision of your 
97 
work ( the answering of letters from governmental and 
non-governmental agencies desiring information), as 
defined goes far beyond what the Congress ever thought 
of including in a public information set=up. Obviously 
if you are going to take over the whole correspondence 
of the Department of Defense and call it public informa-
tion work you are going away ou tside the original field 
that was contemplated.ll3 
Prior to that, in a conversation with Mr. Swan he 
had asked: 
•••• What study 1 if any, have you made to convince your-
self that the work now being done under the head of 
public information is in fact public information work •••• ll4 
While his contemporaries thought that there was too 
much "going on~ in the various offices Congressman Whitten felt 
strongly that there was a need for informing the public more 
completely about the Russian situation; said he: 
•••• The American public ia not being given a balanced 
portrayal of the facts that exist. I do not think that 
there is a ny question but what this is true •••• 
I wish somebody wou l d t ake the money involved for one 
of these carriers or for one of these air wings, to 
intensify our efforts to find out whether Russia is 
ll2House Hearings, 1956, 22• ci t ., p. 651 . 
113Ibid., p. 667. 114Ibi d., p. 665 . 
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really 10 feet high, or only Bt feet higholl5 
If we are going to have a balanced judgement we should 
have a balanced knowledge of the facts.ll6 
The gentleman from Louisiana, Congressman Edward 
98 
Hebert, had other problema on his mind==and a quick solution: 
Congressman Hess was telling us yes terday that he went 
over there .last year and made a check when a baseball 
game was going on and found 114 people standing around 
looking at television. He counted them. Why were they 
not doing work? It i s all r ight t o have your break for 
coffee, but apparently even "coffee breaks~ in the 
Pentagon l end themselves to overstaffing. You can 
walk over there any day and go in t o a lot of offices 
and see people and wonder what they are doing. 
I Will re turn again to the press agents and the public 
informat ion si t uation. They cried like babies over 
there when the Appropriations Committee in effect cut 
their wat er off 8 but they are doing all right. They 
are doing fine o They had research people in there who 
were devel oping magazine stories, counter propaganda. 
It was a counter propaganda agency over there against 
the Congress under this man Fritchey, who was then 
heading the thing. 
Mr. Wigglesworthg Heading the Public Informa ·t ion 
Service? 
Mr. Heber t g He was the n heading the Public Information 
Serviceo He is now the Goebbels of the Democratic 
Committee o 
Mr. Hruakag Do you remember his first name? 
Mr. Heber t g Yes ,9 Clayton Fritchey. They removed him, 
or he r esigned. 
These are little things tha t I ha ve given you, but they 
set the pattern . ll? 
115House Hearings 8 1956 9 Depar t ment of the Navy, 
~· cit., PPo 108=110. 
116Ibidoa Po 40o 
117Hous e Hearings 9 1954, £2• ci t ., pp. 723-724. 
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If such things indeed set the pattern, the pattern 
was soon changed, for Mr. Hebert's accusation that the office 
was a counter-propaganda agency against Congress was never 
repeated, nor in fact had it been made prior to that time. 
Although the problem of control was covered in 
SECTION II under organization, the following exchange con-
cerning the number of releases allowed by the services and 
the Department of Defense is considered more a ma t ter of how 
the office is conducted, or administered. 
Congressman Sheppard read in a magazine article 
entitled 10 How to Collect Mil l tary Information,~ that the Navy 
Hometown News Center put out 6,569 releasee a day and that 
the Army Center produced 9,043 daily. He then asked Mr. 
Swan, 11Are you familiar with that?~ Mr. Swan replied that 
he was not. Mr. Sheppard then said; 
But if you people have the responsibility of s cruti-
nizing this material, the releases and so forth, it 
would occur to me that you should have some knowledge 
as to whether these services that have been referred 
to here are in reali t y putting out that much stuff, 
and you should know what is in it.ll8 
Mr. Sheppard then figured that the volume of releases mentioned 
would amount to $4 million a year while the limitation that 
year was only $3. 5 million for the en tire military establish-
ment public information program. 
Congressman Miller like Mr. Wigglesworth , was more 
ll8House Hearings, 19561 £Eo £11., p. 640. 
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concerned with the let ter wri ting function of the public ' 
relations people a nd told Mr. Swan : 
It never occurred to me that •••• if a mother wanted to 
know why her boy had not wri t ten, that would become a 
responsibility of the Publlc ·Relations Department. 
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That used to be handl ed by the Company Commander or the 
first sergeant •••• 
Mr. Swan: As to that s ergeant who wrote the letter, if 
you could look back over s ome of those letters you would 
understand why we have a n Inquiry Section now and a good 
letter goi ng ba ck to t he person in r eply. 
Mr. Miller: Sometimes the letters are so good they do 
not mean a thing.ll9 
This subject of letter writing brings us to the next 
subdivision , congressiona l liaison . Most eloquent, and 
humorous, is Representative Daniel Flood who felt the matter 
deserved thorough examination: 
Is it the collective genius of the Public Information 
Coordinating Council that has produced these remarkable 
form letters that Memb ers of Congress ge t from the 
various armed services, which have increased only in 
length and not in information? 
There was a time whe n we asked for some information we 
were brusquel y brushed off wi th l or 2 paragraphs. That 
has improved cons iderably with reference only to the 
length of the letter •••• Obvi oual y it is the result of 
professional technique s , and I would presume it is the 
brain chi l d of a n impos ing array, such as the entire 
Council. I cannot imagine one man giving birth to it. 
Has this Council decided that t he replies to Members of 
Congress should be this ? We all ge ·t them. We have sat 
around and compared them. If there a re ? paragraphs, 6 
of them will be alike, wi th t he exc ept i on of punctuation . 
The last 4 paragraphs are i nvariably i den·tical: MGlad to 
119Ibid., p . 658. 
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have you on board; sorry for your trouble; ~lad you 
wrote us; if we can help you again come in. 
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But nothing ever happens. I have been impressed by this 
genius which has created this weapon. Does your office 
handle this? Do you pass upon these matters of weighty 
policy like that? 
Mr. Swan: No, sir; we do not. 
Mr. Flood: Where does that stuff come from? Who will 
create that letter? 
Mr. Swan: That would come from the legislative affairs 
side-or-our office. · 
Mr. Flood: Now I am back to the Tinker to Evers to 
Chance business. I am still out. 
Mr. Swan: There are two sides to the Assistant Secret-
ary's Office. One is on public affairs and one is on 
legislative affairs. I am the Deputy for Public Affairs. 
Mr. Flood: This is of no interest to you, but I have been 
here at these hearings for 2 weeks and I have been play-
ing a game of hare and hounds. I have actually caught 
up to nobody on 2 or ~ of these problema. I will try the 
next fellow. 
Mr. Swan: Good. 
Mr. Flood: Maybe next year l Will get back to you. It 
seems to develop that way. With my sense of humor it 
probably will not amount to very much anyhow, but I want 
you to know that ~ colleagues apparently do not have 
the same sense of humor I do, and somebody had better 
improve congressional liaison, because it is very shabby, 
and ~ colleagues have their tail feathers mussed ~~ 
believe ~· (Italics not in the original)l20 
One of Mr. Flood's colleagues with ruffled plumage 
was Mr. Scrivner who, in the 1958 Hearings, prefaced hie 
opinion with a backhanded compliment, saying: 
120Ibid., pp. 667-668. 
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•••• As far as legislative liaison is concerned, some of 
them do a fairly good job and yet, on the other hand, 
some of thetnlngs that happen make your blood boil. 
In the first place, when I write to the Secretary of 
Defense or to the Secretary of the Army or to the 
Secretary of the Air Force, I expect a reply from the 
Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Army or 
the Secretary of the Air Force. Maybe it will be pre-
pared by legislative liaison, but if I were merely 
wanting some information, I can pick up the phone and 
call legislative liaison myself. When I write to the 
Secretary, I have a reason for doing it and every 
Member of Congress is in the same position. 
To write to any of the secretaries and get a letter 
back signed by maybe a lieutenant colonel or a colonel 
or even a general does not answer it. If that is going 
to be the program that is going to be followed, I for 
one would just as soon abolish some of these things and 
let the secretaries answer some of their own corres-
pondence. They do not have any more mail to sign than 
I do.l21 
One of the Secretaries, namely Robert Ross, on an 
earlier occasion made legislative feathers fly not by failing 
to answer his congressional mail but by refusing to supply 
requested information. As Mr. Fascell explained it during 
the Moss Committee Hearings: 
•••• (the) Research and Development Policy Council (of 
the Department of Defense) came up with a series of 
recommendations on the need for an increased flow of 
technical information, and classification and declassi-
fication. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force Departments made comments on these · 
recommendations. This is one of the areas which the 
House Government Information Subcommittee is studying, 
so we asked Assistant Secretary Ross for the recommenda-
tions and the comments. 
Assistant Secretary Ross--the Defense Department official 
in charge of legislation and public affairs--has formally 
and officially refused to inform the House Government In-
formation Subcommittee what recommendations, if any, were 
121House Hearings, 1958, Part II, op. cit., p. 1836. 
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presented to improve the flow of scientific information. 
Mr. Ross--the information expert of the Pentagon--has 
decided in his wisdom to restrict information about 
proposals to improve the flow of information. 
For 16 months this subcommittee has been working on 
recommendations for legislation and for administrative 
improvements that will make more information available. 
The Defense Department recently has completed a study 
by experts in the field of scientific information. 
Today we will try to find out, through discussions with 
the legal experts of the Pentagon, just what authority 
of law they claim, to throw the cloak of secrecy over 
the facts of Government necessary to the public and to 
the Congress.122 
The authority claimed was a letter of the President's 
addressed to the Secretary of Defense dated May 171 1954. 123 
However, it is not the legal ramifications of the case that 
are important to this study, rather the end and effect of the 
military public relations representative in the government 
retusing to cooperate with Congress. The act could . safely be 
described as the very antithesis of congressional liaison. 
On a somewhat lighter note Congressman Flood told Mr. 
Allen of another liaison problem: 
•••• I have had occasion when home to •••• call different 
offices, and to my amazement I get some civilian on the 
phone, some totally inadequate juvenile who has no idea 
of military terminology •••• He answers the phone. "Where 
is the duty officer7~ 
122united States Congress, House, Committee on 
Government Operations, Availability of Information From 
Federal Departments and ~gencies, Part 5-Department of 
Defense, 2d Section, Hearings before Subcommittee, 84th 
Congress, 2d Session, November 13, 14, and 15, 1956 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 
1783-1784. 
123Ibid., pp. 1981-1987. 
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•••• Well, the duty officer is having lunch. That is 
all right. I am for that. Or "He will be here in a 
minute. 10 That is all right. He probably is down the 
hall seeing a man about a dog. I am for that, too. 
But is it Public Relations, or whose job is it? First 
of all, must you have civilians? There is nothing in 
the world more frustrating than for a member of this 
subcommittee to pick up a telephone to call a duty 
officer about a morale or emergency release and then 
draw some civilian who does not know you are a Member 
of Congress, and certainly does not know that you are 
a member of this subcommittee and he could not care 
less. You talk to him for 5 minutes and you finally 
convince him that you are a Member of Congress and 
11 Can I please talk to some military personnel?~ If he 
has had a good dinner and a good night's sleep and is 
not unhappy, this fellow will finally put some military 
personnel on the phone who talks your language. 
That happens not once, Mr. Secretary, but that would 
happen at half past 10 tonight. If you do not believe 
me, call up. He would not know who you are, either. 
When you tell him, 10 1 am the Assistant Secretary of 
the Department of Defense for Public Information, 11 that 
will leave him cold. 
I do not know whose shop that is. I called up there 
a couple of weeks ago--where, I will not specify--on 
an emergency matter like that, and I got the most 
effeminate voice that you could believe. I said, "Who 
are you? Are you a civilian?" He said, "Yes." I said 
11Are you a WAC or a WAVE or what are you? 10 He said, "No 
I am a man.~ I would have bet him even money. 
•••• The idea of having this sweet voice coming out of a 
duty office at 11 o'clock at night is not good public 
relations. Maybe the fellow just had bad luck. He 
drew me. 
Haven 1 t you heard of these civilians trying to handle 
these military messages"! Believe me, I have had 
trouble with them over the telephone. They do not 
know what these military abbreviations are. I do not 
know when they started. Maybe you are supposed to 
have civilians there. Maybe the idea is to put 
military personnel in line of duty and take civilians 
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for these more mundane tasks. That has merit. I 
suppose. But at least they should be sent to some 
kind of training school for 10 minutes and you or 
whoever handles these things should point out to 
them, ~When you do business with those men up there, 
be smart. If you ever are lucky enough to get Mr. 
Scrivner or Mr. Flood be doubly smart." But nobody 
does that •••• It is not good, and I am on your team. 
Imagine what happens when you draw somebody who ia 
not. 
Call up tonight about 10 o'clock just for fun and see 
what kind of luck you have. It will astound you, 
what you get.l24 
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As stated before, in other Sections, these are only 
some of the comments on the subjects selected. The quotes 
which follow, on the other hand, are miscellaneous "one-
time'' opinions which are offered to impart general attitude 
and illustrate the variety of areas dealt with. 
Congressman Wigglesworth: A couple of weeks ago, Mr. 
Secretary I wrote you a letter at the suggestion of 1 
or 2 members of the committee, calling attention to an 
Associated Press article which appeared under date of 
March 17, entitled, '118 Types of Guided Missiles Re-
vealed by Pentagon Slip.~ 
I assume you are both familiar with that article. It 
was felt that the committee ought to have an explanation 
of the situation. You remember, the article stated in 
part that 
•••• an official Defense Department catalog of weapons 
shows the United States has at least 18 types of 
guided missiles in use, production, or under test. 
The fact cropped up probably unintentionally when a 
Department production report was included yesterday 
among a file of routine daily orders given to newsmen 
which bore no secrecy lab.el: 
124 House Hearings, 1958, Part II, ~· cit., pp. 
1851-1852. 
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The article goes on, develop~ng what was included in 
that report, including much information believed pre-
viously to be classified. That is the type of thing 
which frankly alarms me in re~sect to the Information 
Service we are talking about. 25 
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In a discussion of training for public relatione 
officers, an administrative function, Mr. Schooley testified 
before the House Committee in February of 1955 that the 
"Chief of Information of each military department has policy 
responsibility. 10 Congressman Ford then asked, 11 Do you think 
those schools are worthwhile?" This was followed shortly by 
another of those statements indicating lack of trust in the 
services• ability to administer their own departments: 
I see a need for Public Information training, but I 
think you have to keep your finger on the operation 
I think that ought to be a function of your office.126 
(The Department of Defense Office of Information) 
Senator Ferguson opined, apparently after a recent 
trip to military installations that: 
There are certain things that the public should know in 
relation to the whole defense program. 
I just felt, as I traveled from base to base, that the 
public relations there is not as important as being 
geared to an overall program to give the pro ple an idea 
as to what is going on. 
Then, ae .he looked over the proposed 1955 budget which 
Mr. Wilson had slashed by one million dollars--primarily 
affecting the services--the Senator asked Mr. Loftis, "Now, 
l25House Hearings, 1955, ..QE• cit., p. 550. 
126House Hearings, 1956, £2• cit., p. 657. 
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ie that the purpose of trying to bring more of it here in 
Washington, to give the picture to the public.?"127 
What the purpose was, how right the reasoning, and 
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how successful the implementation are some of the most pro-
vocative questions facing the reader. One fact, reasonably 
ascertained by the investigator; since the attempted effort 
at centralization of military public relations activities 
in the Department of Defense the number and variety of con-
gressional complaints have increased. 
Congressman Moss, for example, offered this one: 
I have here a document, from Mr. Phillip K. Allen, Deputy 
for Public Affairs in the Office of the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense, titled ''Public Information Pointers." 
In this guide, one of the items, with which I disagree 
rather strongly, states: 
Speeches and announcements can have a great impact 
at home, and abroad; be sure to check them for 
security and policy with the Office of Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Legislative and Public Affairs) 
I think checking them for security is very proper. 
But I recall an incident where the Secretary of the 
Air Force, Mr. Quarles, had some difficulties with a 
speech submitted to Mr. Rosa' Office because of 
questions of policy. I think that the people are 
entitled to know the views of a man who, obviously, 
has the confidence of the President, or he would not 
be serving as Secretary of the Air Force. That is, 
without any screening of those views by the Assistant 
Secretary for Legislative and Public Affairs.l28 
127 Senate Hearings, 1955, 22• cit., p. 159. 
128House Hearings, Moss Commit t ee, March 11, and 12, 
1957, £2• cit., p. 2122. 
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Along these same lines Senators Chevez, Saltonstall, 
Ellender, and Symington found fault with Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Public Affairs, Murray Snyder on June 4, 195?. 
Senator Symington began with: 
I make the suggestion that Mr. Murray Snyder, who has 
issued a statement to one paper saying that Secretary 
Douglas did not mean what he said before the committee, 
be requested to come before the committee. Secretary 
Douglas is a man of honor. I suggest we get Mr. Snyder 
down here to find out why he assumes the prerogative 
of speaking for Mr. Douglas after Mr. Douglas has 
given us a contrary position. I say for the record 
that when the Secretary of a department comes before 
this committee and, under questioning, takes a posi-
tion which later is denied by a press representative 
in the Department of Defense, then I think this com-
mittee should be interested in letting the Secretary 
of the department in question give his position before 
the committee, to see whether or not he was telling the 
truth. 
Senator Chevez: I believe he was telling the truth. 
As a matter of fact, I felt he was one Secretary Who 
knew what he was talking about. 
Senator Saltonstall: Let us have Mr. Douglas here. 
Senator Symington: Also, Mr. Snyder. 
Senator Saltonstall: I believe in getting the facts. 
If somebody said he did not say what he thought he 
said, let us get Mr. Douglas back. I believe in 
getting the facts entirely, and let us get them from 
the source. 
Senator Ellender: I agree with Senator Symington. If 
Mr. Snyder made a statement, denying what Secretary 
Douglas stated, it would be important, and it may be 
very interesting to find out how Mr. Snyder got the 
inf ormation. 
Senator Chevez: I agree with the Senator from Missouri. 
We will have Mr. Snyder up here. 
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Senator Symington: The New York Times, Washington, 
June 1, reads as follows: 
Murray Snyder, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Public Affairs, said the controversy was now being 
"ameliorated ... 
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He added that he was sure M~ Douglas was not fighting 
the Wilson directive. 
Secretary Douglas told us he made a protest on the 
Wilson directive; that he signed one and was in the 
process of getting up another; so I think the committee 
has the right to find out the facts. 
Senator Chevez: We are goint to get the truth. I do 
not take public relations very seriously at times.l29 
Here is a challenge for military public relatione 
practitioners, and perhaps their mufti-clad brothers on 
Michigan and Madison as well. Certainly, at the first 
blush, (and the word does not seem inappropriate here) it 
would appear important to the emerging profession that all 
Members of Congress 11 take public relations seriously" all 
of the time. 
129 United States Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 
1958, Hearings before Subcommittee, 85th Congress, lst 
Session, on H.R. 7665, May 23-June 21, 1957 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 402-403. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CONGRESSIONAL IMAGE 
OF MILITARY PUBLIC RELATIONS 
When measured by the quoted statements contained in 
Chapter II, there is little doubt as to the general feeling 
of the Members of Congress toward military public relations. 
Nevertheless, before the reader brings his own value 
judgements to bear on specific questions, some brief sum-
mary of the subjects and opinions concerning them might be 
helpful. 
This is to say, that having examined the parts, 
before attempting to mold a "Congressional Image 11 for 
evaluation, the parts should be put together. 
I. THE IMPLOSION 
For the sake of brevity, and ready reference, the 
implosion--or quick re-assembling of the parts--will be 
abbreviated and aimed more toward reminding the reader of 
material covered than restating quotes. 
Section I, Familiarit~. It was found that Congress-
men who expressed themselves on the subject were not familiar 
with the functions of any of the offices of public informa-
tion; that the functions had not been adequately explained; 
that most thought the main purpose propaganda, and that 
there was widespread confusion concerning the scope and 
definition of pub~ic relations as practiced by the military. 
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Questions asked generally indicated an abysmal lack 
of knowledge of the aims, or responsibilities of the Office 
of Public Affairs or of previous services rendered. 
Section II, Organization. The major complaints of 
Congress on the organization of the military public relations 
community were lack of centralization, coordination, and 
control. Included were numerous accusations of over-
lapping, unnecessary offices, loose supervision, little 
or no authority, and inefficient organization. 
Specific examples of the services withholding 
information, refusing requests from the public and the 
Department of Defense, plus admittedly not being bound by 
a chain of command, made a rather strong case for Congress' 
opinion that public relations were better in the ~old days,~ 
and should be limited to a narrow base. 
Section III, Economy. The Legislators believe that 
there is no better method of correlating the activities of 
the Office of Public Affairs then reducing its appropriations; 
that the Office should be di vested of fringe activities; that 
too much is spent in the field offices; that personnel are 
not properly utilized and their number should be reduced; 
that there is also a waste of talent and money; that the 
money "kicked back~ to the Office of Public Affairs by the 
services should be shown in the budget; and that the 
services are not charging all of the activities that should 
be charged under the limitation. One Congressman thought the 
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limitation impractical, and another charged there was con-
siderable public disapproval of the public relations set-up 
coupled with the conviction that quite a little money could 
be saved. 
Section IV, Releaseo In discussing the release of 
military information the paramount issue was the misuse of 
the Office to disseminate "self-serving propaganda," i.e., 
information designed to make the military look good, garner 
public support, influence legislation, etc. The second most 
frequently heard remarks were on the withholding of non-
classified information, e.g., material not deemed a 
"constructive contribution" to the primary mission of the 
Department of Defense. 
Examples were forthcoming of the release of mislead-
ing information, cross-information, non-information, too 
much information, and no information. Also deplored was the 
absence of standardization, objectivity, authenticity, and 
public retraction. In short, according to Congress, the 
public failed to get complete, accurate, or timely informa-
tion relative to the military establishment. 
Section V, Security. The consensus was that the 
classification-declassification policy needed complete 
overhauling. Beyond that there was no agreement. One group 
of Congressmen affirmed that too much information of value 
to potential enemies was released, while the other group 
mourned the burial of information required by the public to 
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intelligently meet its responsibility in a democracy. 
Within the two camps were some vehement complaints, e.g., 
that classification is censoring history, blocking scientific 
progress, used as a cover for personal fear of embarrassment, 
preventing government from functioning properly, gagging high 
officials, and is a deliberate method of withholding public 
information. 
In the '1pro" group--those for more classification--
it was charged that damage done by public information 
releases, leaks, trade journal stories, and speeches greatly 
exceeded that done by spies and subversives. The final con-
clusion: The Department of Defense was the most restrictive 
and confused government agency, and within the Department the 
responsibility fo~ what ~and was not released rested with 
the Office of Public Affairs. 
Section VI, Administration. There is absolute agree-
ment among the Members that the service rivalry for headlines 
must be eliminated. Other observations were: too much work 
is being done which is not public relations; personnel super-
vision is poor; offices are circumventing the limitation 
purpose through administrative shenanigans; not exercising 
responsibility in scrutinizing releases; and are careless in 
administrative procedures. 
Of some moment was the feeling about congressional 
liaison--poor, and the letter writing talent in general of 
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public relations people--worse. And lastly, perhaps 
Defense Secretaries should, whenever possible, not refuse 
congressional requests for information. 
II. THE IMPLICATIONS 
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As stated in Chapter I, the investigator will not 
draw conclusions--preferring to let the reader interpret the 
research material as he sees fit. There are a number of 
reasons for this, the most compelling being that unless an 
opinion study is conducted under carefully controlled con-
ditions with scientific research methods, the researcher's 
conclusions, though possibly well founded, cannot be 
presented with any measured mathematical veracity.l 
While the comments of the Members of Congress are 
believed sufficiently salient to satisfy the hypothesis, 
the degree to which they can be used to make or project other 
assumptions is purely speculativ~. There are, however, 
certain broad implications which might properly be included 
as part of the study. 
The reader is invited to review the questions offered 
on pages eighteen and nineteen, all of which, the Congressmen 
have answered to some extent in their remarks. Based on the 
almost totally negative view which Congress has taken toward 
1see discussion of Limitations, pp. 21-22 this study. 
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the Office of Public Affairs, one of many offices in the 
Department of Defense, certain other things may be implied. 
For example: 
There were a number of areas of complaint which are 
not necessarily peculiar to public relations activities 
although that was the context in the quotes selected, e.g.J 
the strongest and most frequent opinions were concerned with 
the general inefficiency of the Department of Defense organ-
ization, in that, there was waste of talent, personnel and 
money, no coordination, correlation, or control of the ser-
vices or various sub-offices, and that as a result there was 
service rivalry, poor security policy, and confusion. 
The constant repetition of the charges over a six 
year period leads one to suspect that the feelings expressed 
may not be isola ted, or reserved for a single office of the 
Department of Defense. To use an analogy, it is unheard of 
for high blood pressure to build up in only one part of the 
body. 
From these suppositions, and recent legislative 
attempts ~imed at shrinking the Department,2 it might be 
implied that Congress has come to believe that unification, 
or centralization of the military establishment has been 
given a fair try, and proved inefficient. 
2The Vinson-Arends Bill to reduce the number of 
Assistant Secretaries is an example. 
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If this is so, and Congress gradually manifests its 
belief with what it considers to be appropriate action, then 
the present Executive position is directly threatened and a 
battle looms, for it is well known that the President favors 
maximum unification. 
The purpose of this conjectural discussion--which may 
seem to be far afield from the subject of the study--is to 
see what the future holds for military public relations in 
view of these possible implications. 
For the overall establishment there are really only 
two courses open, (1) to decentralize and thus re-accentuate 
the identity of the separate services, or (2) truly central-
ize. and establish one military department. 
Up to now, each course has been soundly criticized by 
the proponents of the other as impractical, impossible, and 
imprudent. The present system of limbo-like semi-unification 
is the resulting compromise. It is this system which is 
constantly under fire not only from Congress but all other 
quarters. 
Under the first course, assuming a 10 watered-down" 
version of the Defense Department remained in existence, in 
all probability there would be no big change in present 
military public relations procedures, or problems. The 
individual services might eventually obtain more "legitimate" 
funds for public relations through direct representation at 
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appropriations hearings, which they do not have now. But at 
the seat of the government the problems of standardization 
of procedure, rivalry, overlapping, duplication, loose 
policy control, rather than unity of command, and so forth, 
would remain to irritate, annoy, and confuse the Members of 
Congress. 
From this, it follows that the limitation of funds 
would be continued, and eventually no formal program of 
public relations worthy of mention would exist because of 
the stigma attached. 
Under course number (2), there could be only one 
Office of Public Affairs, Information, Public Relations, or 
whatever title, and it would supervise all of the field 
offices. Theoretically speaking, there would be no service 
rivalry, less waste of money, manpower, and talent, absolute 
control of policy and administrative procedures, and thus 
less confusion. 
Whichever course of action is chosen, or evolves, 
there is one other element not yet mentioned which in the 
end is the controlling factor. That is, of course, the 
human element. For without active, intelligent direction, 
by men trained in the field of public relations, no program 
can, or will, succeed, regardless of organization structure. 
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This leads to the final implication of the remarks 
which Congressman have been making since 1952; until we 
have professional public relation's leadership sensitive to 
each of the many publics--including Congress--which must be 
satisfied with the conduct of the Defense Establishment, it 
is doubtful that public, press, service, or Congressional 
opinion of military public relations can be improved or 
enhanced. 
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Washington 
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MEMORANDUM 
From: The Secretary of Defense 
To: The Secretary of the Army 
The Secretary of the Navy 
The Secretary of the Air Force 
The Chief of Staff of the Army 
The Chief of Naval Operations 
The Chief of Staff of the Air Force 
The Chairman of the Munitions Board 
The Chairman of the Research and Development Board 
Subject: Public Relations of the National Military Establishment. 
I. General Policy 
A. The armed forces of a democratic nation have a 
positive responsibility to achieve the widest pos-
sible public understanding of their mission and 
operations. Therefore, information about the National 
security shall be released. 
B. The National Security Act of 1947 establishes the 
unification of the armed services. It is to be em-
phasized that the conduct of public relations is to 
conform to the spirit of the law and that inter-
service controversies are to be avoided. The 
Secretar i es of the three Departments will be responsi -
ble for explaining this policy to all personnel and 
for enforcing c omplianc e with it. 
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II. Security 
A. Establishment and definition of security classi-
fications shall continue to be the responsibility of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff; assignment of security 
classification to a document, information or material 
shall continue to be done by the branch of the armed 
service having cognizance. · 
lo Both the defini ti ons and the assignment of 
classifications should be revised periodically, 
releasing any information no longer requiring 
classification. 
2. The Secretaries of the three Departments shall 
arrange for their public relations divisions 
to interchange regularly lists of activities 
and materiel which require security clearance 
prior to release so that one Department will 
not unknowingly break the security classifica-
tion of another. 
3. Release of newly declassified information 
involving two or more agencies should be 
approved by all the agencies involved. 
III. Organization 
A. The public relations activities of each Depart-
ment shall continue to be administered by the 
Secretaries, following the general policies as 
established and as may be changed from time to time. 
1. In the interes t of conserving manpower, space 
and communications, distribution and duplica-
tion of facilities, the Secretaries of the Army, 
the Navy, and the Air Force are requested to 
study and to report by December 1, 1947, on 
the feasibility of --
a. Establishing in the national capitol a 
single press and information room, jointly 
staffed by the Armed Services, for the dis-
semination of all public information from 
all branches of the National Military 
Establishment. 
b. Establishing in the field similar central 
jointly-staffed press rooms in key cities 
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like New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, 
even though the boundaries of military 
districts, naval districts and air commands 
do not coincide exactly. 
B. No separate public relations division will be 
established in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, but one of his assistants will be desig-
nated to handle public relations matters. 
1. The heads of the public relations activities 
of the three Departments are hereby designated 
an advisory board to the Secretary of Defense 
on the conduc t of public relations. 
a. Each service is requested to detail a 
liaison officer to the Offi ce of the 
Secretary of Defe ns e to assist in the 
c oordination of public relations activi-
ties; including military participation in 
special a nd civic events. 
2. No information in the categories listed below 
shall be released by any Department without prior 
clearanc e wi th the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense.--
a. Stat ements quoting or citing the authority 
of the Secret ary of Def ense. 
b. Announceme nts by the Wa~ Council, the 
Muniti ons Board, the Research and Development 
Board a nd t he Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
c . Announcements on those sub j ects (principally 
general policies , budget-making and other 
subj ects) which by t he terms of the National 
Security Act are made the specific responsi-
bility of the Secretary of Defense. 
d. Public addresses by members or the War 
Council , Munitions Board and Research and 
Development Board. 
e. Releases affecting more than one of the t hree 
Departments in the military establishment or 
other Exec utive Departments when mutual agree-
ment cannot be reached by the departments or 
agencies concerned. 
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3. Before material is submitted to the Secretary 
of Defense for clearance under 2 above, the 
initiating service will obtain agreement or 
comment from all activities concerned. After 
release is authorized, details of effecting 
publication will be handled by the apprqpriate 
branch of the military establishment. 
James Forrestal 
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APPENDIX B 
CONGRESSIONAL SAMPLE 
1. Sen. Joseph C. O'Mahoney, Wyo. (D) 
2. Rep. Edward T. Miller, Md. (R) 
3. Sen. Dennis Chavez, N. M. (D) 
4. Sen. Margaret Chase Smith, Me. (R) 
5. Sen. Leverett Saltonstall, Mass. (R) 
6. Rep. Glenn R. Davis, Wis. (R) 
7. Rep. John J. Riley, s. c. (D) 
8. Sen. Homer Ferguson, Mich. (R) 
9. Rep. Richard B. Wigglesworth, Mass. (R) 
10. Rep. Errett P. Scrivner, Kans. (R) 
11. Rep. John E. Moss, Calif. (D) 
12. Rep. Dante B. Fascell, Fla. (D) 
13. Sen. Carl Hayden, Ariz. (D) 
14. Rep. Gerard R. Ford Jr., Mich. (R) 
15. Rep. F. Edward Hebert, La. (D) 
16. Sen. Allen J. Ellender, La. , (D) 
17. Rep. George W. Andrews, Alae {D) 
18. Rep. Harry R. Sheppard, Calir. (D) 
19. Sen. Milton R. Young, N. Do {R) 
20. Rep. Harold C. Ostertag, N. Y. (R) 
21. Rep. Jamie L. Whitten, Mi ss. (D) 
22. Rep. Clare E. Hofrman, Mich. (R) 
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24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
Rep. 
Rep. 
Sen. 
Sen. 
Rep. 
Rep. 
Rep. 
George H. Ma};_lon, 
Daniel J. Flood, 
Stuart Symington, 
Hubert Humphrey, 
Charles B. Deane, 
Oarl Vinson, Ga. 
Roman L. Hruska, 
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Tex. (D) 
Pa. (D) 
Mo. (D) 
Minn. (D) 
N. a. (D) 
(D) 
Neb. (R) 
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All categori es a nd types of informat ion possessed by 
t he Departmen t of Defense are a vailable to the press and 
oth er information med i a servi ng the gene r al public, except 
that which requires protect i on f or reasons of national 
defense or the release of which would ot herwise be incom-
patible wi th the nat i onal interes t o Th e types of information 
which might be withheld ~ or to whi ch acces s might be limited, 
under particul ar c ircums t a nc es , f al l in t o two basic groups. 
The first group covers i nfor mati on r equiring protection in 
t he interest of national def ense which is wi t hheld or contr ol led 
in di s semination pur s uant t o Executive Or der 10501, dated 
Nov ember 5 , 1953, a s implemented by departmen ta l directives 
a nd i nstruc t i ons. This i s normally referr ed to as classified 
informat ion. The s ec ond group cover s certa i n other offic i al 
information r equi r ing pro tection for t he nat i onal defense and 
the overal l nationa l interes t and i s withheld, or controlled 
in disseminat i on , purs ua nt to var i ou s const i tut i onal, statutory, 
or execut ive bra nch r equirements , a s i mpleme nted by depart-
mental directives or i nstruct i ons o Following, i t iB believed, 
are the major subcategori es of infor ma tion in this latter group, 
which, of cour s e , ca nnot be de emed al l i nclu s i ve since there 
are probably s ome isola t ed s itua tions which do not neatly fit 
t h em: 
(1) Records a nd infor mat ion which per t a in t o indi viduals 
s uch as personnel rec ords , medica l re c ord s , and i nvesti gative 
r eports , documents , a nd proceeding s of a dmini strat ive boards 
or mil i tary tri bunals . 
(2) Information a s to the i dent i ty of c onf i dential 
informant s and inf orma tion furnished by them in confidence. 
(3 ) Informati on r e ceived in c onf i denc e f r om pr i vate 
i ndivi duals, firma , or or gani zati ons in c onne ction with bids , 
proposals , trade secre ts , patents , a nd reports of a f i nanc i al, 
technical , or scientific na t ur eQ 
(4 ) I nformati on which i s , or ma y reas onabl y be expected 
to b e, c onnec t ed wi t h any pending or a nti cipated l it i gation 
b ef ore Fe deral a nd State court s or regulatory b odieso 
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(5) Advance information on proposed plans to procure, 
lease, or otherwise acquire or dispose of materials, real 
estate, facilities, or functions, which would provide undue 
or discriminatory advantage to private or personal interests. 
(6) Preliminary documents relating to proposed plans 
or policy development when premature disclosure would ad-
versely affect morale, efficiency, or discipline. 
(?) Examination questions and answers to be used in 
training courses or in a determination of qualifications of 
candidates for employment, entrance to duty, and advancement 
or promotion. 
(8) Information as to communications between members 
of the executive branch, the release of which could hamper the 
candor among such members in advising with each other which is 
essential to efficient and effective administration and the 
preservation of the proper separation of powers between the 
executive and legislative branches of the Government. 
(9) Information disclosure of which would be of intell-
igence value to a potential enemy, where particular circum-
stances render it impracticable to technically "classify" 
the information under the provisions of Executive Order 10501. 
(10} Information received from other Government 
agencies for official use of the Department of Defense, any 
further dissemination of which is controlled by the agency 
which provided such information. 
(11) Atomic restricted data. 
(12) Information furnished by friendly foreign nations 
to the United States in the course of cooperative defense 
activities the release of which, without their approval, could 
jeopardize the safety of such friendly foreign nations. 
